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Much attention has been paid to identifying the causes of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) and developing public policy responses to prevent its 
reoccurrence.  Attention has turned to identifying blameworthy actors.  
There is consensus that financial fraud played a role in exacerbating the 
crisis.  In spite of this, there have been few prosecutions.1  Only one Wall 
Street executive has been jailed2 and few firms involved in the events 
leading up to the crisis have been sued or prosecuted.3  Moreover, the 
statute of limitations for fraud, which is typically five years, has expired.  
This lack of accountability is troubling.  Mayer, Cava and Baird argue that 
“[w]ithout changes to the existing system, the lack of accountability for 
antisocial acts of financial fraud may become a permanent feature of our 
economy.”4  But, all hope is not lost.  Recently, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has discovered a little-used statute5 enacted in the wake of the 
 
 1.   See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1410-
1411 (2014) (discussing the government practice of assessing corporate fines coupled with 
the use of deferred prosecution agreements rather than pursing criminal penalties).  This 
lack of prosecution can be compared to the large number of prosecutions following the 
Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980’s.  See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have 
No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS Jan. 9, 2014, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/, archived at http://perma.cc/NDH5-VFGM (“In striking contrast with these 
past prosecutions, not a single high-level executives has been successfully prosecuted in 
connection with the recent financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant 
criminal prosecutions are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, it appears that none 
will be.”).  
 2. See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, April 30, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-
crisis.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XN4X-ACQH (describing why only one Wall 
Street executive went to jail for his involvement in the financial crisis); See also Zaring, 
supra note 1, at 1413 (arguing that imposing civil liability largely on corporate actors is 
inconsistent with the prior practice of prosecuting individual executives for fraudulent 
wrongdoing).  See also Zaring, id., at 1439 (identifying some potential defendants and 
concluding that “[n]one of these potential defendants have been singled out, even though the 
harsh expression of disapprobation presented by a criminal case might seem to be 
appropriate given the intense nature of the carnage.”). 
 3.   Zaring, supra note 1, at 1438 (“There has not been a single conviction of a bailed-
out bank, or a single executive who ran one.”).   
 4.   Don Mayer, Anita Cava & Catharyn Baird, Crime and Punishment (or the Lack 
Thereof) for Financial Fraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies 
for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 519 (2014).   
 5.   Not only have there been few lawsuits brought in its 25 year history, it has been the 
subject of little scholarly commentary.  Most commentary has focused on the director and 
officer liability provisions.  See, e.g., Robert J. Basil, Suspension and Removal of Bank 
Officials Under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA), 18 J. LEGIS. 1 (1991) (describing the suspension and removal provisions under 
FIRREA); John J. Bryne, Douglas W. Densmore & Jeffery M. Sharp, Examining the 
Increase in Federal Regulatory Requirements and Penalties: Is Banking Facing Another 
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Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980s.  The Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)6 imposes civil liability 
for violation of certain specified criminal statutes.  FIRREA’s statute of 
limitations is longer, its burden of proof is lower, and the penalties can be 
severe.7  It was used to force the Bank of America and Standard & Poor 
settlements,8 and could be used to impose liability on other bad actors for 
their actions leading up to the GFC.  Moreover, its use has the potential to 
transform the financial fraud landscape.  But, is that a good thing?  
Certainly enforcing anti-fraud provisions is desirable.  However, at least 
one commentator has questioned FIRREA’s resemblance to a criminal 
statute.9  If FIRREA is in effect a criminal statute stripped of the procedural 
safeguards afforded by criminal law, this is problematic and raises 
questions of fundamental fairness. 
This article will consider those broad questions.  In order to 
accomplish that goal, we will, in Part I, briefly outline the events leading 
up to the GFC.  This has been done elsewhere in more depth and it is not 
our intent to replicate previous work.  In Part II, we will outline the basic 
provisions of FIRREA.  In Part III, we will briefly consider the use of 
 
Troubled Decade?, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (“While traditionally shielded by 
corporate law from liability for losses so long as they exercise good faith business judgment 
and act disinterestedly, directors are now confronted with the threat of virtual strict 
liability. . .”); Peter A. Lowy, The Director Liability Provision of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act: What Does it Do?, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 355 
(1997) (discussing the director liability provision under FIRREA); Jon Shepherd, The 
Liability of Officers and Directors under the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1119 (1992) (discussing civil liability for 
officers and directors under FIRREA); Melinda M. Ward, FIRREA – Finally Resolved?, 67 
UMKC L. REV. 407, 408 (1998) (describing the context that led to the FIRREA legislation).   
 6.   Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA]. 
 7.   The statute of limitations under FIRREA is ten years.  FIRREA, §1833a (h).   
 8.   See Nate Raymond, Bank of America Liable for Fraud in Countrywide Mortgage 
Case: Jury, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 23, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/23/bank-of-america-fannie-mae-freddie-
mac_n_4151479.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XWG9-ELD6 (describing Bank of 
America’s liability under FIRREA for actions that led to the financial crisis).  See infra 
notes 76-116 and accompanying texts where these lawsuits are discussed.   
 9.   See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response 
to the S & L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 179 (1991) (stating that a civil proceeding 
under FIRREA is “basically a criminal proceeding stripped of such constitutional 
protections as the presumption of innocence and the requirements of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”).  See also John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Bank Fraud 
Prosecution Act of 1990: Has Congress Gone too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 246 (1993) 
(“The provisions allowing civil penalties for criminal offenses are unfair because they allow 
the prosecution to circumvent the criminal standard of proof for these offenses.”).   
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FIRREA in cases stemming from the GFC.  Our intent is to demonstrate 
the far-reaching implications of FIRREA and to outline existing case law.  
Here, we will examine the cases brought by the DOJ against Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York Mellon and Standard & Poor’s. 
This brings us to the inevitable question.  FIRREA appears to be a 
viable and formidable weapon in the war on financial fraud.  But is it good 
public policy?  In Part IV, we will consider two directions of inquiry.  First, 
liability is imposed in the case of financial fraud largely to promote 
investor confidence in the market.  This is an important public policy 
objective and arguably achieved by FIRREA as an enforcement tool.  
Second, imposition of civil liability for violation of criminal statutes 
appears to blur the distinction between civil and criminal law.  However, 
the public policy objectives promoted by civil law differ from those 
intended by criminal law.  FIRREA allows for an action to be brought by a 
civil prosecutor, seeking civil damages, with a civil burden of proof for 
violation of criminal law.  This section of the article will consider whether 
this is good public policy.  In this section, we will reject the dichotomy 
between civil and criminal law and consider whether FIRREA is most like 
administrative law.  Although we can learn a lot from a comparison with 
administrative law, it is also not a perfect fit.  We will conclude that 
although some commentators have concerns about imposing liability based 
on criminal law without the protections typically afforded in criminal 
prosecutions (e.g., the heightened burden of proof), we are not persuaded 
by those concerns.  We believe that concerns about imposing civil liability 
for violation of criminal law without the safeguards afforded criminal 
defendants are based on the conventional but antiquated view of the 
distinction between civil and criminal law.  Instead, we believe that a more 
appropriate analysis looks at whether the procedural safeguards afforded by 
FIRREA are fair.  In Part V, we conclude that the procedural safeguards 
required can best be viewed on a spectrum based on the severity of the 
punishment.  Therefore, largely because of the absence of the possibility of 
incarceration in a FIRREA case, we conclude that given the government’s 
overwhelming objective to protect the financial markets and investors and 
to generate confidence in the market, FIRREA is good public policy. 
I. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The GFC began as a housing boom.10  In the years prior to the GFC, 
borrowing rates were at historically low levels and credit was easy to 
 
 10.   See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the 
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 46 (2009) (discussing the practice of relying on 
securities backed by subprime mortgages as a contributing factor to the GFC).  
ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  2:52 PM 
2015] USE OF FIRREA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY 123 
 
obtain.  These low interest rates, especially those associated with the early 
years of adjustable rate mortgages,11 fueled demand for housing and led 
homebuyers to purchase homes that were more expensive than they could 
afford.  This set the stage for unprecedented appreciation in home prices.12 
In order to understand why lenders would lend to purchasers who 
could not afford the houses and the loans, one must understand the 
securitization process.  Through the securitization process, mortgage 
originators sold individual mortgages into a pool of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs).13   These mortgages were then housed in special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) that created and issued new debt securities with the 
mortgages serving as underlying collateral.14  The securities were typically 
issued in three tranches, with the first tranche bearing the most credit risk 
and subsequently carrying the highest rate of return.  The third tranche was 
supposedly the most insulated from the risk of default and, hence, carried 
the lowest return.15  Credit rating agencies rated each tranche to allow 
investors to gauge the credit risk involved.  Unfortunately, the ratings were 
 
 11.   These adjustable rate mortgages often started with a low interest rate that allowed 
borrowers to qualify for a larger loan than they might have if they had instead obtained a 
fixed rate loan.  See generally John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 
6 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 403, 406 (2009) (describing the increase in no-document loans from 
2001 to 2006); Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities 
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1359, 1394 (2009) (describing how adjustable rate mortgages often started with a low 
interest rate that allowed borrowers to qualify for later resets at higher rates they could not 
afford).  
 12.   Between 1997 and 2006, home prices actually rose by 124%!  Moran, supra note 
10, at 20.  
 13.   See generally Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures 
in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1118-1122 (2009) 
(arguing that “rating agencies’ underestimation of the risks of mortgage backed securities” 
was economically rational); Mendales, supra note 11, at 1364-68.  The practice of 
securitization became so prevalent that over two-thirds of all mortgages were securitized in 
2005.  This contrasts with less than 20% of mortgages securitized in 1999.  Nicole B. 
Neuman, A ‘Sarbanes-Oxley’ for Credit Rating Agencies?  A Comparison of the Roles 
Auditors’ and Credit Rating Agencies’ Conflicts of Interest Played in Recent Financial 
Crises, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 921, 924 (2010). 
 14.   John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct 
Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 
1371, 1386 (2008).  See also Moran, supra note 10, at 34 (describing tranches in the 
mortgage pool); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007) (explaining collateralized debt 
obligations).   
 15.   The task of deciding how much principal was allocated to each tranche was a 
complicated task accomplished by using models based on “quantitative finance.”  John 
Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the ‘Worldwide Credit Crisis’: The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 109, 118 (2009). 
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determined using statistical models that failed to accurately measure the 
likelihood of default for each tranche.16  Securities comprising the riskiest 
tranches were created and re-bundled in a way that still allowed the upper 
80% of the structure to be rated highly and disguised the fact that the 
underlying assets were often subprime loans.17  Because of information 
asymmetry,18 these securities were marketable only because of the CRA 
rating.19 
As housing prices rose, there was increased pressure on mortgage 
originators to issue and securitize even more mortgages.20  This pressure 
 
 16.   See John Crawford, Hitting the Sweet Spot by Accident: How Recent Lower Court 
Cases Help Realign Incentives in the Credit Rating Industry, 42 CONN. L. REV. 13, 
16(2009).  
 17.   See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction – Structured Finance and Credit 
Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 53, 69 (2009) (“This magical 
transformation was achieved in spite of the fact that the underlying securities belonged 
largely to the lowest rated tranches of the original subprime securitizations.”).  See also 
Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Crisis of 07, 
7(Working Paper, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1112467, (“[T]he rating agencies 
assigned AAA ratings to CDO’s senior bond tranches that did not reflect the CDO bond’s 
true credit risk.”).  CRAs viewed bundling MBSs as a “statistical problem” and did not think 
it was necessary to analyze the underlying mortgages.  David Schmudde, Responding to the 
Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 747 
(2009).   
 18.   See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (defining information asymmetry 
in the MBS context and explaining its effect). 
 19.   See Coffee, supra note 11, at 409 (“In overview, investment banks bought unsound 
loans because they knew they could securitize them on a global basis if – and only if – they 
could obtain investment-grade ratings from major credit rating agencies. Without that rating, 
the debt was unmarketable.”). See also Dennis, supra note 13, at 1122 (“Thus, the rating 
agencies became the de facto gatekeepers of the market.”); David J. Matthews, Ruined in a 
Conventional Way: Responses to Credit Ratings’ Role in Credit Crises, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 245, 250 (2009) (“With respect to structured finance issuances, however, the CRA 
rating takes on a gatekeeper role. . .”); Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies and the 
Financial Crisis: Less Regulation of CRAs is a Better Response, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. & 
REG. 170 (2010) (emphasizing the importance to packagers of obtaining favorable ratings on 
the securities in order to sell the securities).   
 20.   See generally  Damon Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and 
the Financial Crisis—Linkages between Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance 
Markets, and the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 301, 302 (2009) 
(analyzing consumer debt as the cause of the financial crisis).  Moreover, as the MBSs were 
themselves repackaged for more than their underlying value, there was increased pressure to 
both originate new mortgages and to create and sell additional derivatives.  See also Claire 
A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 585, 590 (“[W]ith someone to sell the loans to, lenders discovered a new 
enthusiasm for making them.”); Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a 
Primary Cause of the Crisis 2, 5 (U. San Diego, Research Paper No. 09-015, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653 (“These transactions, too, persisted over time, so much so 
that the appetite for second-level mortgage securitizations drove financial intermediaries 
both to originate new and increasingly risky mortgages, and to create synthetic exposure to 
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resulted in lax behavior on the part of mortgage originators.21  Credit 
checks of applicants became superficial and often loans were extended 
without verifying income, employment, or assets.22  Subprime lending 
became common23 and mortgages were issued to borrowers who would 
have not previously qualified.  The practice of requiring a 20% down 
payment towards the purchase of a house was virtually abandoned; interest-
only and balloon payment mortgages became popular.24 
Favorable ratings25 by CRAs exposed the greater economy to these 
 
mortgages, which then could be resecuritized through tranched special purpose entities, 
again at higher prices than the underlying mortgage-backed securities were trading in the 
market.”).  
 21.   Coffee, supra note 11, at 406. Coffee describes this as “a classic moral hazard 
problem.  Because you do not bear the risks, you will expend little time or effort on 
precautions, such as screening borrowers.”  Id. See also Alyssa King, The Protection of 
Deposits and Depositors: A Limited Interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1833A, 63 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 759, 763 (2013-2014) (“This environment created a moral hazard problem in which 
the banks, encouraged by the government and regulators, took on risky bets”).   
 22.   The “no doc” loans often led to fraudulent loan applications and some of them 
were termed “liar loans.”  See Mendales, supra note 11, at 1394-1395 (discussing such 
loans).  See Matthews, supra note 19, at 252 (describing how securitization both “spread 
risk” and “diluted responsibility.”).  Some argue this lead to an “explosion in mortgage 
fraud.”  See, e.g., Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory 
Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 
236-237 (2009) (“Given its prevalence and scope, many commentators have speculated that 
such fraud was at least partly to blame for the collapse of the mortgage market, and in turn 
for triggering the credit crisis.”).  Moreover, the numbers of such loans grew.  See Deryn 
Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict 
Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605, 614-
615 (2009) (“In 2001, 28.5% of subprime borrowers could not verify information about 
employment, income, or other credit-related data.  This figure increased to nearly 51% in 
2006.”).  In addition, subprime mortgages without documentation of the borrower’s income, 
assets or employment grew to 44% of the subprime market by 2005.  Silvers & Slavkin, 
supra note 20, at 329. 
 23.   Subprime loans are loans made to people where the potential for default is higher 
than other mortgages.  Matthews, supra note 19, at 246 (“The term connotes lending to 
borrowers whose employment history, savings, credit history, or other characteristics create 
a higher expectation in the lender of loan default as compared to prime borrowers.”).  
Subprime lending grew substantially during this period.  See Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull, 
supra note 17, at 4 (“By 2006, subprime mortgages represented 13% of all outstanding 
mortgage loans with origination of subprime mortgages representing 20% of new residential 
mortgages compared to the historical average of approximately 8%.”); Darcy, supra note 
22, at 614 (“[S]ubprime mortgages accounted for 20%, or more than $600 billion, of all 
mortgages originated in 2005.”); Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 20, at 328 (“In 2001, 
subprime lending represented 7.2% of mortgage originations but exploded over the next five 
years until they reached 20% of mortgage originations in 2006.”).   
 24.   E.g., interest-only loans increased from 0% of housing loans in 2001 to 23% in 
2006.  Coffee, supra note 11, at 407.   
 25.   The justification for these higher than merited ratings was a belief that any risk was 
lessened by the broad diversity of loans contained in each pool, especially geographic 
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toxic securities because institutional investors, like pension funds and 
banks, added them to their portfolios.  The money that was received by the 
MBS issuers from securitizing mortgages was funneled back to mortgage 
lenders and mortgage brokers who then issued increasingly risky 
mortgages.  The credit quality of the mortgages was of no concern to the 
mortgage companies because the mortgages and the credit risks were 
transferred to the SPV.  The origination fees received for issuing additional 
mortgages provided a powerful incentive which encouraged mortgage 
originators to issue even more mortgages.26 
It is clear that mortgages were granted that should not have been.  It is 
clear that the securities that were created by bundling these mortgages were 
rated much higher than they should have been and that in some cases they 
were actually worthless.   Moreover, it is clear that many of the parties 
involved were engaged in intentionally fraudulent activities.  In fact, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that many of the subprime 
lenders were guilty of fraudulent lending practices and that some Wall 
Street actors packaged and sold these loans in ways that were fraudulent.27 
Such financial fraud can be prosecuted as mail/wire fraud28 or 
 
diversity.  Moran, supra note 10, at 47.  Moran equates this to a game of Russian roulette 
where the likelihood of a disastrous outcome appeared to be so low that it was ignored by 
CRA models. Id.  In other words, CRAs believed that it was highly unlikely that all the 
mortgages in the pool would default in unison because any downturn in housing would be 
geographically localized.  Id.  Moreover, it was assumed that housing prices would continue 
to rise; hence, even if a borrower defaulted, there was little risk because the values of the 
underlying collateral would continue to cover any isolated losses.  Coffee, supra note 11, at 
407.   
 26.   See King, supra note 21, at 763 (“The deregulation of financial institutions 
encouraged the mortgage industry to issue risky mortgages under the securitization system 
because they were paid based on the volume of the loans processed”).  See also Brooke A. 
Murphy, Credit Rating Immunity? How the Hands-Off Approach Toward Credit Rating 
Agencies led to the Subprime Credit Crisis and the Need for Greater Accountability, 62 
OKLA. L. REV. 735, 740 (2010) (“The originator, therefore, has no incentive to maintain 
prudent lending standards, since its profits derive solely from transactional fees, and not 
from the eventual repayment of the mortgage.”).   
 27.   THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REP. ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE U. S. (Comm’n Print Jan. 2011) at xxii (Accessed at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report).  See also King, supra note 21, at 765 (“Along every step 
of the process, fraud occurred and incentives encouraged risky lending, haphazard 
compositions of the securities, and the inaccurate ratings of the securities to reflect the 
associated risk”). 
 28.   18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012).  Under mail/ wire fraud, one faces liability if he 
engaged in 1) an intentional scheme to defraud; 2) through the use of interstate mails or 
wires.  In order to prove a scheme to defraud, the government must demonstrate a 
misrepresentation of a material fact or a willful omission.  See Carpenter v. United States, 
108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987) (holding that an employee may be criminally liable under the 
mail and wire fraud statutes when he intentionally leaks confidential business information).  
See also Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 524 (stating that under the mail and wire 
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securities fraud.29  Why then have so few of these actors been prosecuted?  
Putting aside questions of political will,30 it appears that one main obstacle 
to imposing criminal liability upon both individual and corporate 
wrongdoers has been the mens rea requirement.  Because of the severity of 
criminal sanctions, criminal liability is not imposed lightly.  Among other 
safeguards, in order to attach criminal liability, the defendant must have 
committed the act intentionally – the so-called mens rea requirement.31  
Meeting the mens rea requirement is typically more difficult than meeting 
the scienter requirement or specific intent requirement necessary to prove 
fraud.32  A second obstacle relates to the fact that it is often difficult to meet 
the burden of proof required to criminally prosecute financial fraud cases. 
One way around these obstacles to criminal prosecution is by use of 
FIRREA.  Enacted in the aftermath of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 
1980s, FIRREA provides civil liability for violation of certain specified 
criminal statutes.  As such, it offers a vehicle to “punish past fraud and 
deter future fraud” in cases where imposing criminal liability is blocked by 
either the mens rea requirement or the burden of proof obstacle.33  In Part 
II, we will outline the basic provisions of FIRREA. 
II. FIRREA 
FIRREA was enacted in the wake of the Savings & Loan (S & L) 
crisis.  As the true proportions of the crisis became apparent, there were 
calls for action.34  Congress perceived that fraud committed by both 
 
fraud statutes, anyone using the respective means covered by each statute to commit fraud 
can be held criminally liable and punished).  
 29.   15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
 30.   Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 518. 
 31.   Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2009). 
 32.   See Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Rating 
Agencies: Use of the Corporate Ethos Theory of Criminal Liability, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167 
(2014) (considering the difficulty of meeting the mens rea requirement in the case of 
corporate crime).  See also Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 525-527 (discussing how 
fraudulent intent can be inferred from the conduct of the parties).  
 33.   Leon Weidman, Civil Remedies for Mortgage Fraud, U. S. ATT’YS’. BULL. (U. S. 
Dep’t of Just. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys., Wash., D.C.), May 2010, at 23. 
 34.   It is not unusual for statutes to be enacted in the wake of crisis.  See, e.g., 
Prosecuting Fraud in the Thrift Indus.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Reps., 101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Charles E. 
Schumer, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of 
Reps.) (noting before a hearing that “[i]n the last 2 years, the Bank Board, the regulatory 
agency that oversees the thrift industry, referred 11,000 cases to the Justice Department for 
criminal prosecution.  The flourish of referrals came after years of relative inaction on the 
Bank Board’s part which appeared to favor pursuing civil suits to the exclusion of making 
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outsiders and insiders (e.g., officers and directors of those institutions) 
against financial institutions was a major factor leading up to the crisis.35  
In fact, it was estimated that fraud accounted for between 10-100% of 
savings and loan failures.36  There were several statutes already on the 
books that could have been used to prosecute wrongdoers.37  For example, 
the National Banking Act of 186338 made embezzlement and 
misapplication of bank funds criminal39 and the bank fraud statute of 1984 
extended many of the prohibitions to bank insiders.40  There were, however, 
 
criminal referrals.  Yet the Department of Justice obtained conviction in fewer than 200 of 
these 11,000 cases.  That means that in less than 2 percent of the criminal cases referred to 
the Department of Justice has real punishment been exacted.  It should be remembered that 
the fraud, the enormous losses and the failed and ailing institutions actually account for only 
a small portion of the entire thrift industry.  That’s why it’s more important than ever that 
we ferret out these few bad apples that threaten to drag down an entire industry.  We should 
also recognize that the very tangible benefits we receive from vigorous prosecution, $10 
billion, would go a long way towards housing the homeless or feeding the poor, educating 
the public, caring for the sick. . . . What faith can the public have in the system if it permits 
this type of activity to go on with impunity? . . . [W]hy have there been so few successful 
criminal prosecutions for bank fraud? . . . [D]oes the administration’s proposal for 
remedying the thrift crisis get to the heart of the system’s failings in processing these 
cases?”).  See also Elisa S. Kao, Moral Hazard During the Savings and Loan Crisis and the 
Financial Crisis of 2008-09: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk 
Through Disincentive Structures to Maintain Firm Size and Interconnectedness, 67 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 817, 860 (2012) (opining that a “good crisis should never go to waste.”).  
The Savings & Loan Crisis was no exception.  See also LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L 
DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 180-181 (1991) 
(describing FIRREAs as “an Act of anger” on the part of Congress); Carol Ann Sennello, 
FIRREA’s Damage Provisions: Inequitable, Unnecessary, and Costly to Boot, 45 DUKE L. J. 
183, 183 (1995) (characterizing Congress as being in a “bad mood” when it enacted 
FIRREA). 
 35.   H.R. REP. NO. 100-1088, at 1, 8 (1988).  See generally Green, supra note 9, at 155-
156 (stating that federal officials stressed that criminal misconduct by insiders played a 
large part in the thrift crisis); John J. McDonald, Jr., Similarities Between the Savings & 
Loan Crisis and Today’s Current Financial Crisis: What the Past Can Tell us about the 
Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 470, 473-74 (2009). 
 36.   Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Congressional Re-Election Through Symbolic Politics: The 
Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1994) (describing early 
estimates of loses due to insider fraud at 25-100% and bipartisan estimates of between 10% 
and 15% percent); See Kao, supra note 34, at 833 (discussing estimates of the degree to 
which criminal activity by insiders contributed to the Savings & Loan crisis).  See also 
Green, supra note 9, at 162-168 (outlining this underlying belief and questioning the degree 
to which criminal conduct was realistically an important contributing factor). 
 37.   See, e.g., Rowlett, supra note 9, at 241-242 (1993) (listing alternative available 
criminal statutes). 
 38.   National Banking Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 675, (1863). 
 39.   18 U.S.C. § 656.  See Green, supra note 9, at 157-160 (discussing the 
misappropriation provision and its applicability to maladministration by bank insiders). 
 40.   18 U.S.C. §1344 (1988). 
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relatively few successful prosecutions in the financial services industry41 
and sentences imposed in those cases were typically light.42  A new statute 
was seen as the answer. 
FIRREA was designed in part to provide a mechanism for the 
government to recover some of the bailout costs associated with the S & L 
crisis43 and more broadly to control “outright fraud and insider abuse.”44  
Thus, the statute represented Congressional intent to punish45 wrongdoers 
who engaged in fraud as well as to deter future fraudulent activity.46  To 
accomplish this goal, FIRREA provides the federal government with a 
significant amount of flexibility.  First, it authorizes the DOJ to seek civil 
penalties47 for those who violate one of fourteen specified criminal laws 
 
 41.   Contra Zaring, supra note 1, at 1441 (comparing the criminal prosecution during 
the savings and loan crisis to the GFC and noting that “by 1992 there had been 1100 
criminal prosecutions of individuals involved in major S&L fraud, with 839 convictions, 
and, in total, 5490 criminal investigations opened by the FBI.”). 
 42.   Green, supra note 9, at 161 (“The sentences meted out to defendants who 
committed banking crimes, however, were generally lenient . . . .”). 
 43.   King, supra note 21, at 766; See Lowy, supra note 5, at 356 (outlining the basic 
provisions of FIRREA and breaking them into five categories: 1) those that set aside money 
for resolutions; 2) those that provide for new agency enforcement powers; 3) those that 
dissolve the FSLIC and the FHLBB; 4) those that attempt to assure that a similar problem 
will not occur again; and 5) those that attempt to recoup losses); See also Ward, supra note 
5, at 408 (estimating that the costs to taxpayers exceeded $1 trillion). 
 44.   H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(1), at 294 (1989).  One of the general purposes of the statute 
is “[t]o strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise 
damaging depository institutions and their depositors.”  FIRREA § 101(10). 
 45.   It has been described as a “punitive piece of legislation.”  Sennello, supra note 34, 
at 183.  Bryne, Densmore and Sharp opine that “[f]ocusing on several dishonest individuals, 
Congress apparently extrapolated that the banking and thrift industries had been populated 
by the dishonest.”  Bryne, Densmore & Sharp, supra note 5, at 1.  See also Green, supra 
note 9, at 168 (arguing that retribution was one of the primary goals of FIRREA “‘to get a 
pound of flesh from those who committed fraud’”) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. s9488 (daily ed. 
July 11, 1990, statement of Sen. Domenici). 
 46.   United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 24, 2013) (FIRREA is “consistent not only with seeking to prevent fraud perpetrated 
against the financial institutions, but also with deterring or punishing fraud . . . .”).  See 
United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing deterrence as a 
major goal of the enhanced civil/criminal provisions).  See also Robert Almon, Matt Greve, 
& Nick Wamsley, Financial Institutions Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2013) 
(“FIRREA was passed with the intention to ‘both clean up the savings and loan mess and 
prevent future disasters.’”) (quoting John Leubsdorf, Symposium on James Atleson’s Values 
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective 
Article: Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 974 (2009)); Lowy, supra note 5, at 
379 (“The language of FIRREA as it was signed into law makes clear that FIRREA’s 
purpose is to strengthen the False enforcement powers and to deter unacceptable activities 
that arguably caused or contributed to the savings and loan crisis.”). 
 47.   See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (arguing that these civil penalties 
can be imperfectly analogized to administrative penalties imposed by administrative 
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involving financial institutions.48  Second, because the fines are civil in 
nature, prosecutors merely have to show by a “preponderance of the 
evidence” that the elements of the underlying crime were met.49  This lower 
burden of proof greatly enhances the prospects for successful enforcement 
of federal fraud statutes.  Third, it creates a mechanism to gather 
information using administrative subpoena power rather than having to 
commence litigation to trigger the discovery process.50  Fourth, it 
harmonizes civil forfeiture provisions with the general racketeering statute, 
allowing regulators the ability to seize assets before they can be placed out 
of the government’s reach.51 
Fifth, it extends the statute of limitations to ten years to provide 
regulators with sufficient time to uncover and take action against fraud.52  
Lastly, it allows for payment of a reward to individuals to provide crucial 
information to prosecutors53 and a whistleblower provision to protect bank 
employees from retaliation.54  Some of these provisions merit further 
attention. 
A. Civil Penalties 
FIRREA, as a so-called “hybrid” statute,55 provides civil penalties and 
 
agencies). 
 48.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1)-(3); FIRREA § 951. 
 49.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h); 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f). 
 50.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(g). 
 51.   See, e.g., Michael Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and 
Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 1117 
(1989) (examining FIERRA’s enforcement methods).  See also Marc S. Nurik & Susan R. 
Healy, New Federal Banking Legislation: No More Mr. Nice Guy, 65 FLA. B.J. 53 (1991) 
(providing a general overview of the statute). 
 52.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h). The typical statute of limitations for civil fraud suits is 
between three and five years.  Jennifer Ecklund, The Evolving Definition of Mortgage 
Fraud: Analyzing the Changes in Interpretation Through Court Cases and Legislation since 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, ASPATORE, 2014 WL 3725824 (2014).   
 53.   FIRREA, § 933(b).  See Bryne, Densmore & Sharp, supra note 5, at 16 (describing 
bankers as “hunted prey” because of this provision). 
 54.   FIRREA § 932.  See Rowlett, supra note 9, at 250-251 (arguing that the “bounty 
hunter provisions” coupled with the whistleblower provisions provide a financial incentive 
for biased or perjured testimony).  Attorney General Holder has called for reform increasing 
the amount of the rewards to 30% of the sanctions imposed.  See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, 
$1.38B S&P Settlement Cements FIRREA As DOJ Darling, Law 360 (accessed at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/618042/1-38b-s-p-settlement-cements-firrea-as-doj-darling, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9CP7-3MZL). 
 55.   United States ex rel. Edward O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. 
Supp. 3d 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y 2014).  In this regard, FIRREA is similar to racketeering 
legislation.  It is no coincidence that the statute specifically states that the procedures 
applicable to civil investigation demands under FIRREA are the same as those used in 
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civil forfeiture in response to criminal activity.   Under Section 951, civil 
liability is attached if the defendant violates one of a specified number of 
criminal statutes.56  The predicate offenses are broken into two categories: 
a) those that apply without any additional limitations;57 and b) those that 
apply only if the violation is one “affecting a federally insured financial 
institution.”58  As such, these offenses relate to fraudulent activity involving 
financial institutions, or conspiracy to engage in a scheme to defraud a 
financial institution.  For our purposes the most important predicate 
 
investigations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  18 U.S.C. 
§§1961-1968 (2013) [hereinafter, “RICO”].  Not only are FIRREA and RICO structured 
similarly, they share a number of predicate offenses, including bank fraud, wire fraud and 
mail fraud.  Congress patterned aspects of FIRREA after the RICO statute in order to 
facilitate civil actions, safeguard federally insured assets, and penalize misconduct in the 
financial services industry.   
 56.   H.R. 1278 identified eight predicate offenses in the federal criminal code that could 
be used as the basis for assessing civil penalties involving fraud in the financial services 
industry.  H.R. 1278 allows for the imposition of civil penalties for violating the following 
sections of Title 18: § 215 (bank bribery); § 656 (misapplication and embezzling related to 
banks); § 657 (misapplication and embezzling related to federally insured financial 
institutions); § 1005 (placing of false statements by an insider in the books of a bank); § 
1006 (placing of false statements by an insider in the books of an S&L); § 1007 (making a 
false statement to the FDIC to induce the FDIC to enter into certain transactions); § 1014 
(making a false statement to a federally insured institution in order to obtain credit); § 1344 
(bank fraud). REP. ON THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT 
ACT OF 1989, H.R. Rep. No 101-54, pt.5 at 5 (1989) [hereinafter, “Judiciary Committee 
Report”].  In addition, the legislation allowed for penalties to be imposed for mail fraud (18 
U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) and conspiracies related to wire and mail 
fraud. Judiciary Committee Report at 5.  Six additional predicate offenses were later added 
by the House Judiciary Committee, bringing the total to fourteen. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1)-
(3) (1966).  The six additional offenses were: 18 U.S.C. §287 (false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
claims); 18 U.S.C. §1001 (false statements); 18 U.S.C. §1032 (concealment of assets from a 
conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent); and 15 U.S.C. §645(a) (false statements 
regarding the overvaluation of securities).  See 101 Cong. Rec. H17198 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 
1989) (record of amendment to FIRREA).  See also, Judiciary Committee Report at 9 
(explaining the amendments relating to civil penalties). 
 57.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1), (3) (1966). There are nine offenses listed here.  These 
include financial institution bribery, theft or embezzlement from a financial institution, false 
entries in financial institution records, false statements to influence the FDIC and false 
statements to influence regulators or financial institutions on an application.  
 58.   12. U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (1966). There are five offenses here. These include false 
claims to the United States, false statements within federal jurisdiction, concealing assets or 
impeding the FDIC and mail/wire fraud.  The statute does not define what is meant by 
“affecting” a financial institution, but there is reason to believe that this requirement will be 
interpreted broadly.  See King, supra note 21 at 768 (outlining the case law considering this 
question); Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud 
“Affect” a Financial Institution?, 99 BNA BANKING REP. 186 (2012) (accessed at 
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/36/doc/understanding-firreas-reach.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/E8F6-TMT9).  Moreover, see infra notes 81-82, 94, 101 and 
accompanying text (discussing the “self-affecting doctrine”).  
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offenses are:  1) mail and wire fraud; 2) making false statements; and 3) 
financial institution fraud.  These fall into the second category.  As such, 
they are actionable only when their violation affects a federally insured 
financial institution. 
FIRREA provides for civil penalties as an alternative to the criminal 
penalties specified in the federal criminal code.59  As a general proposition, 
the maximum fine is set at $1.1 million per violation.60  For continuing 
violations, the penalty may not exceed the lesser of $1.1 million each day 
or $5.5 million in total.61  However, these caps can be disregarded if any 
person derives any financial gain from violating any of the predicate 
offenses, or if a victim suffers a loss from the activities of a violator, which 
exceeds the $1.1 million/$5.5 million caps.62  The statute also provides that, 
for the purposes of calculating the civil fine, losses include those suffered 
by the various Federal depository insurance programs.63  In such a case, the 
maximum fine levied may be equal to – but no greater than – the amount of 
gain by the perpetrator(s) or loss by the victim(s). 64 In addition, the statute 
makes clear that the amount of the fine can be tailored in a way that not 
only provides adequate deterrence but also avoids harm to innocent parties, 
 
 59.   Early drafts of the legislation called for these civil penalties to be levied in addition 
(and not as an alternative) to criminal penalties set forth in the federal criminal code.  
However, there were concerns that the civil penalties might be characterized by the courts as 
criminal in nature, and thus, vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  This was at least in part a response to the Supreme Court case of U.S. v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) which upheld double jeopardy challenges.  Judiciary 
Committee Report, supra note 56, at 6.  See generally Matthew Hofer, Madison Lichliter & 
Bridgette Makia, Financial Institutions Fraud, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1209, 1237-1238 
(2014) (discussing double-jeopardy questions raised by FIRREA).  Thus, the civil penalty 
section was significantly altered in the final bill.  Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 
56, at 7 (“The Committee on the Judiciary amended the civil penalty provisions in a number 
of ways to address [the double jeopardy] concerns.  The fundamental purpose of these 
changes is to modify this penalty provision to make it a civil penalty in fact and law as well 
as in name.”).  The court in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997), discussed the 
degree to which FIRREA’s civil sanctions might invoke double-jeopardy and found that 
where the civil sanctions are intended to serve a deterrent function the fact that they also 
serve a punitive function will not convert civil sanctions into criminal punishment.   
 60.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1) (1966). It should be noted that the fines authorized in 
FIRREA are subject to adjustment pursuant to the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties 
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410. As such, the thresholds set in the 
original FIRREA statutory language have been increased to$1.1 million.  See, 28 C.F.R. § 
85.3(a)(6).  
 61.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(2) (1966), as adjusted, per 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(7). 
62 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)(A) (1966) , as adjusted, per 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(6) and 
(a)(7). 
 63.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(3)(B) (1966). 
 64.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)(A) (1966). 
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like taxpayers and depositors.65  By tying the maximum fines to economic 
gains by the perpetrator(s) and/or losses by the victim(s), Congress 
attempted to insulate FIRREA's civil penalty provisions from 
Constitutional challenge.66 
B. Standard of Proof 
Because FIRREA imposes civil liability, the federal government must 
prove its case by the traditional civil standard of “preponderance of the 
evidence.”67  In other words, the government must prove only that it is 
more likely than not that the defendants violated one of the fourteen 
predicate offenses relating to defrauding a financial institution.  This is a 
significantly easier burden than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden 
imposed in criminal cases.68  Williams et al. termed meeting this burden a 
“walk in the park” compared to the more rigorous burden of proof in 
criminal cases.69 
 
 65.   Bank of New York, supra note 46, at 463.  See, e.g., United States v. Menendez, 
No.11-06313, 2013 WL 828926, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (setting forth the relevant 
factors applicable to setting the penalty including “(1) the good or bad faith of the defendant 
and the degree of his scienter; (2) the injury to the public, and whether the defendant’s 
conduct created a substantial loss or the risk of substantial loss to other persons; (3) the 
egregiousness of the violation; (4) the isolated or repeated nature of the violation; and (5) 
the defendant’s financial condition and ability to pay”). 
 66.   Early drafts set civil penalties at a maximum of $1 million per incident or $5 
million maximum.  Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 5.  It was feared, 
however, that the capped fine might be viewed as more punitive than remedial.  Relying on 
dicta from the Supreme Court in Halper, the Judiciary Committee felt that in order for the 
penalty to be properly considered civil in nature, there must be a rational relationship 
between the penalty amount and the government loss.  Thus, they rejected the proposed 
penalty of a maximum fine of $1 million regardless of the government’s pecuniary loss.  
See, Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56 at 6 (explaining the amendment tying the 
penalty to loss to the government).  See also, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1)-(3)(1966) (outlining 
the applicable civil fines for FIRREA violations). 
 67.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (1966). 
 68.   Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 7.  This was a change from earlier 
drafts of the statute.  As the Banking Committee considered H.R. 1278, an amendment was 
offered to set the burden of proof for civil penalties using a “clear and convincing” standard.  
Lower than the “reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal charges and penalties, the 
“clear and convincing” standard was considered, in part, to reinforce Congressional intent to 
establish the civil nature of the penalties.  Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 8.  
However, the Judiciary Committee lowered the burden of proof even more.  When the bill 
was taken up by the Judiciary Committee, the civil fine provision was redefined to 
withstand judicial scrutiny.  Confident that the civil fine provision would not run afoul of 
the Constitution’s Double-Jeopardy Clause, the Judiciary Committee then lowered the 
burden of proof to the traditional civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 
7-8. 
 69.   Jay Williams, Valarie Hays & Mir Ali, FIRREA: An Old Acronym is Turning into 
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C. Administrative Subpoenas and Other Fact-Finding Tools 
FIRREA provides prosecutors and regulators with enhanced powers to 
obtain information from potential defendants and other parties.  Under the 
statute, they are authorized to subpoena documents, summon witnesses, 
and seek testimony under oath, so long as the government is acting in 
anticipation of bringing civil charges under FIRREA.70  In doing so, 
Congress obviated the need for prosecutors to actually commence litigation 
and begin the discovery process to obtain evidence.  As long as the 
government intends to seek redress under FIRREA, prosecutors may use 
administrative powers to compel production of documents and obtain 
testimony.  No court order is required in this context.71  Moreover, the civil 
attorneys in the DOJ are allowed to freely receive any information obtained 
as part of the criminal investigations by the DOJ, including grand jury 
information.72 
D. Civil Forfeiture 
FIRREA provides regulators with the additional tool of civil forfeiture 
to deal with fraud in the financial services industry:  civil forfeiture.  By 
allowing the DOJ to seize assets connected to bank fraud, prosecutors and 
regulators are empowered to safeguard a financial institution’s assets 
before they can be transferred offshore or otherwise put beyond the 
government’s reach.73  While a number of statutes authorize asset 
 
the Government’s New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING 
L.J. 579, 580 (2012) (“FIRREA is a comparative walk in the park for government attorneys 
compared to the rigorous burden of proof required in criminal cases and the criminal 
discovery rules, which are focused largely on protecting a criminal defendant’s rights”).   
 70.   12 U.S.C. § 1833a(g)(1) (A)-(C) (1966).   
 71.   See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
749, 782 (2013) (characterizing this as an “extraordinary grant of pre-suit civil discovery.”).   
 72.   See Green, supra note 9, at 179 (“The result is that civil attorneys for the 
government and criminal prosecutors may work in tandem in developing evidence.”); 
Manns, supra note 71, at n. 181 (“Additionally, FIRREA allows criminal grand jury 
material to be passed on for use in DOJ civil suits without a court order.  This means that the 
DOJ can potentially use any material developed in the pursuit of a failed criminal 
investigation to have a second bite at the apple in a civil proceeding”).   
 73.   FIRREA, § 963.  The House Judiciary Committee amended the Banking 
Committee’s version of H.R. 1278 to allow the use of civil forfeiture for banking related 
offenses.  Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 9.  In addition, Congress amended 
the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012) et seq., to include the following as predicate 
offenses: 18 U.S.C. § 215 (receipt of gifts or commissions for procuring loans); 18 U.S.C. § 
656 (theft or embezzlement by a bank officer); 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Embezzlement, 
Abstraction, Purloining or Willful Misapplication); 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (placing of false 
statements by an insider in the books of a bank); 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (placing of false 
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forfeitures, this provision was modeled after the RICO provisions allowing 
for forfeitures of any property obtained in violation of the statute.74 
III. FIRREA’S RECENT USE 
Although FIRREA was enacted in 1989, it was virtually ignored as a 
vehicle to address financial fraud until the GFC.75  This section will outline 
its use in four illustrative cases from the GFC:  United States v. Bank of 
New York Mellon, United States v. Bank of America, United States v. Wells 
Fargo and United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies.  These cases provide 
guidance as to the developing FIRREA case law as well as offering 
evidence of its far-reaching application and of its power as a tool to combat 
financial fraud. 
 
statements by an insider in the books of an S&L); 18 U.S.C. § 1007 (making a false 
statement to the FDIC to induce the FDIC to enter into certain transactions); 18 U.S.C. § 
1014 (making a false statement to a federally insured institution in order to obtain credit); 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud).  Id.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2012) (listing 
offenses that the violation of will subject property to forfeiture). 
 74.   For a discussion of civil forfeiture in general and RICO specifically, see Lisa H. 
Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.  321, 350 (2007) (discussing RICO forfeiture 
provisions).  Before the government can obtain civil forfeiture under RICO, the defendant 
must first be convicted of a RICO violation.  Id.  See also id. where Nicholson argues that 
asset forfeiture is a better deterrent in the case of white collar crime, especially fraud, than 
either incarceration or fines.  In FIRREA cases, on the other hand, the guilt or innocence of 
the property owner is irrelevant; it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to 
which forfeiture attaches.  In contrast, criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam 
proceedings, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the 
property and only to the extent of defendant’s interest in the property.  See Bennis v. 
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that forfeiture provision was not a violation of 
Due Process); United States v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” DeLuxe Model, 250 PA 23 Aircraft, 
321 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding lower court’s judgement of forfeiture); United 
States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars (Calhoun), 
403 F.3d 448, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that civil forfeiture was permissible); United 
States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d at 146 (vacating and remanding forfeiture order); 
United States v. Liquidators of European Federal Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“The government may pursue civil forfeiture even after a failed criminal 
prosecution.”). 
 75.   Previously, FIRREA had been used primarily against officers and directors of 
failed financial institutions.  Robert Anello, New Justice Department’s FIRREA Cases 
Against Banks: Holding the Victim Responsible, FORBES: THE INSIDER (May 16, 2013, 11:41 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/05/16/new-justice-departments-firrea-cases-
against-banks-holding-the-victim-responsible, archived at http://perma.cc/98E6-HTH4.  
Therefore, most of the commentary on the statute concerned the director and officer liability 
provisions.  
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A. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM)76 
This case was one of the first cases to use FIRREA stemming from the 
GFC.  As noted above,77 FIRREA provides for civil liability for violating 
certain specified criminal statutes where the actions of the defendants 
affect a federally insured financial institution.  In this case, prosecutors 
brought a claim under FIRREA against the BNYM, alleging that the bank 
violated mail and wire fraud statutes in three ways.  First, BNYM 
represented that it provided “best execution” when pricing foreign 
exchange trades under its “standing instructions” program.78  Under the 
standing instructions service, BNYM automatically provided currency 
exchange services as the need arose, and the client was not aware of the 
actual exchange rate until after the transaction was completed.  Second, the 
complaint alleges that BNYM represented that it engaged in netting to 
benefit clients.  Netting allows a bank to aggregate exchanges and can 
result in significant cost savings to the client.  Third, the complaint alleges 
that BNYM asserted that all standard instruction clients would receive the 
same pricing.  Contrary to the representations, the pricing adopted by 
BNYM was not consistent with industry understanding of best execution.  
Instead of providing its clients with the best prices it could obtain in the 
market, BNYM collected all standing trade requests throughout the day and 
held them.  Each afternoon, the bank determined an aggregate level needed 
to accommodate all client requests and executed the needed transactions on 
its own behalf in the spot market.  Later, it determined a price for each 
transaction.  BNYM was able to profit from this method of exchange.79  
With respect to netting, it appears that some trading desks netted the trades 
and others did not.  Third, the Bank allegedly did not provide the same 
pricing to all clients.  The complaint alleges that BNYM profited 
enormously from these practices.  For example, standing instructions trades 
generated 69% of the foreign exchange trading profits in spite of the fact 
that they accounted for only 12% of the foreign exchange trading volume.80 
In the BNYM case, the court considered the novel question of whether 
 
 76.   Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (2013). 
 77.   See cases cited and statutes cited supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text 
(outlining “predicate offenses” that can serve as the basis for civil penalties under FIRREA). 
 78.   Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 442, 444-447. For the facts 
referenced to in this section, see id. at 444-448 (discussing BNYM’s allegedly improper 
actions).  
 79.   Id. at 447 (“For example, BNYM might sell euros to a client at the highest price at 
which the euro traded that day, while buying euros from another client at the lowest price at 
which the euro had traded.”). 
 80.   Id. at 448. For discussion of these allegations, see id. at 447-458 (referencing the 
allegations against BNYM).  
ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  2:52 PM 
2015] USE OF FIRREA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY 137 
 
the affected institution required by statute could in fact be the defendant.  
In other words, does the behavior that complies with the predicate offense 
have to be committed by a third party?  The complaint in the BNYM case 
alleges that the bank practices which constituted mail and wire fraud 
affected BNYM in several ways.  First, these practices provided large 
profits to the bank.  Second, the practices exposed the bank to the potential 
for liability and legal fees.  Third, when clients learned of these practices, 
many withdrew their business.  Relying on these assertions and a plain 
reading of the statute and its legislative history, Judge Kaplan rejected the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding: 
“[i]n passing FIRREA, Congress sought to deter fraudulent 
conduct that might put federally insured deposits at risk.  Where, 
as alleged here, a federally insured financial institution has 
engaged in fraudulent activity and harmed itself in the process, it 
is entirely consistent with the text and purposes of the statute to 
hold the institution liable for its conduct.”81 
This decision is interesting in that the bank is essentially both the 
defendant and victim of the wrongdoing.  The court expressly rejected the 
argument that “affecting” meant “victimizing.”82  Arguably, this 
interpretation of FIRREA creates civil liability for essentially any financial 
crime committed by a financial institution. 
A second issue discussed by the BNYM court concerned how 
significant the effect on the institution had to be.  The court acknowledged 
that the effects had to be direct enough to trigger statutory liability.  But, 
the court found the effects alleged in the complaint to be sufficient, stating:  
“[T]he alleged negative effects are slightly removed from the 
underlying alleged scheme insofar as they manifested only when 
that scheme was revealed, not as it was ongoing.  No matter.  The 
touchstone of proximate causation is reasonable foreseeability, 
and it certainly was reasonably foreseeable that this alleged 
scheme, if uncovered, would result in these kinds of harms to the 
Bank.” 83 
The last issue considered by the court had to do with the scienter 
requirement.  The court opined that there were two components needed to 
 
 81.   Id. at 443.  See also id. at 457 (The court “declines to conclude that an institution 
cannot be affected by a fraud solely because it participates in it.”).  See King, supra note 21, 
at 777-779 (briefly discussing this issue). 
 82.   Id. at 451 (“If Congress had wanted to limit civil penalties to cases in which the 
financial institution was the victim, it obviously could have done so; instead, it chose a 
singularly broad term.”). 
 83.   Id. at 460.  See also id. at 459 (discussing that the effect had to be “substantially 
direct” in order to trigger liability).  
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meet the scienter requirement for mail/ wire fraud:  1) intent to deceive; 
and 2) contemplation of harm to the victim.  The court then concluded that 
intent to deceive can be inferred from the conduct of the parties.  The 
complaint alleged that bank employees knew that their practices were 
inconsistent with industry norms and took active steps to conceal the actual 
method in which their trades were priced.84  The court found these 
allegations to be sufficient.85 
B. United States v. Countrywide Financial Corporation/Bank of 
America86 
The second case to apply FIRREA to the GFC was United States v. 
Countrywide Financial Corporation.  In this case, prosecutors alleged that 
defendant banks violated mail and wire fraud statutes by originating loans 
in violation of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae guidelines and then selling 
those loans to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae while representing that they 
had adhered to those guidelines.  Specifically, as default rates were rising 
in 2007, Countrywide adopted a streamlined loan origination model.  As 
part of this model, Countrywide eliminated checks on loan quality and 
compensated employees based solely on the volume of loans originated.  
This allegedly led to an increase in the amount of fraud and serious loan 
defects.87  Because of escalating default rates, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
began tightening their requirements and refused to purchase risky loans.  
This was communicated to lenders, including Countrywide.  Well aware of 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s actions, Countrywide represented to 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae that it had tightened the underlying 
guidelines.88  Moreover, Countrywide was aware of the fact that many 
aspects of the Hustle model violated Fannie/Freddie guidelines.89  In fact, 
Countrywide’s internal reports revealed material defect rates of 57% in the 
 
 84.   Id. at 443.  For further discussion of the scienter issue, see id. at 463-464 
(discussing the court’s reasoning behind its decision on the scienter issue). 
 85.   Id. at 470 (The complaint “alleges a pattern of misrepresentations by Bank 
employees who, the [complaint] plausibly alleges, knew that their representations were 
false.  These give rise to a strong inference that these Bank employees intended to deceive 
customers into believing that they were receiving best execution as the [complaint] alleges 
that term is understood”).  
 86.   Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d at 494 (2014).  
 87.   Id. at 497.  See also Complaint-in-Intervention, infra note 88, at ¶ 3-5 (discussing 
the emphasis on quantity instead of quality of loans).  This loan origination model was 
called “the Hustle.”  Id. at ¶ 2-4. 
 88.   Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America at ¶ 51, U.S. ex rel. 
O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d 494 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) 
(No. 12 Civ. 1422). 
 89.   Id. at ¶ 66.  
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Hustle loan pool overall.90  Thus, Countrywide’s internal reports revealed 
that more than half of the loans that were “cleared to close” were ineligible 
for sale to any investor, even though those loans were to be sold to Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae.91  In addition, Countrywide concealed both its bonus 
structure from Fannie/Freddie and the fact that its quality control team was 
incentivized to rebut quality control findings.92 
The complaint alleged that the fraud affected Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac investors; however, neither Freddie Mac nor Fannie Mae are federally 
insured financial institutions.93  Therefore, the question again became 
whether the defendant banks can themselves be the affected financial 
institutions (what has now become termed the “self-affecting” theory).  
Again, the court held that the FIRREA requirement had been met.  Relying 
on the plain meaning of the statute, the court found that “the fraud here in 
question. . . had a huge effect on BofA defendants”94 and therefore the 
requisite affect was met. 
Thus far, this case is the only FIRREA case to have gone to a jury.  
On October 23, 2013 a jury returned a verdict in favor of the government; 
Judge Rakoff subsequently imposed damages in the amount of $1.2 
billion.95 
 
 90.   Id. at ¶ 70. 
 91.   Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d at 499. 
 92.   In addition, it is alleged that Countrywide offered employees an incentive for 
rebutting earlier findings that loans were defective.  Complaint-in-Intervention of the United 
States of America at ¶¶ 90, 107, Countrywide Home Loans, 33 F. Supp. 3d 494 (No. 12 Civ. 
1422) (“Another former Fannie Mae executive commented that it was misleading for 
Countrywide to be representing, on the one hand, that it was tightening its underwriting 
controls, while simultaneously engaging in a game of ‘catch me if you can’ on the quality 
control side”).  
 93.   Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States at ¶¶ 131—133. Recall that mail 
and wire fraud violations are only actionable if they impact a federally insured financial 
institution.  12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2).  See, e.g., King, supra note 21, at 784-785 (discussing 
this requirement). 
 94.   United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014).  See also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d at 494. 
 95.   Id. at 497.  Judge Rakoff relied in large part on the guidelines set forth by the 
Menendez court.  See Menendez, No. CV 11-06313 MMM, 2013 WL 828926, at *5-6 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (setting forth the relevant criteria).  After reviewing the facts of the case 
relevant to those criteria, Judge Rakoff described Countrywide’s actions as “the vehicle for 
a brazen fraud by the defendants, driven by a hunger for profits and oblivious to the harms 
thereby visited, not just on the immediate victims but also on the financial system as a 
whole.”  Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d, at 503. 
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C. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank96 
In another illustrative case, FIRREA claims were brought against 
Wells Fargo Bank.  Wells Fargo Bank was a participant in the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s Direct Endorsement Lender 
Program.  As a participant in that program, Wells Fargo agreed to comply 
with HUD regulations related to granting mortgages.  After granting a 
mortgage, the lender in this program must make certain certifications 
regarding compliance with HUD regulations.  For example, the lender must 
certify “the integrity of the data” used to determine the quality of the loan, 
must perform due diligence on the loans granted, and must implement a 
quality control system to review loans.97  These mortgages are then 
automatically granted HUD mortgage insurance.  The government alleged 
that Wells Fargo engaged in reckless lending practices and falsely certified 
to HUD that their loans were eligible for Federal Housing Administration 
insurance.98  Specifically, the complaint alleged that Wells Fargo used 
inadequately trained employees, paid a bonus based on the number of loans 
written, pressured loan officers to close loans, required a short turnaround 
time and employed lax underwriting standards and controls.99  Moreover, 
the complaint alleged that Wells Fargo’s own Quality Assurance 
department noted a high violation rate and notified senior management of 
the riskiness of the loans being granted, but the Bank did nothing in 
response to these results.  Lastly, knowing that approximately half of their 
mortgages were granted in violation of HUD regulations, the Bank 
submitted claims for 97% of them.100 
By now the self-affecting theory had become well settled.  Judge 
Furman denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss saying that the argument 
“merits little discussion.”101   Here, the court found that the defendant 
bank’s actions had created an increased risk of loss to the bank. 
 
 96.   United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593(S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 97.   Id. at 600.   
 98.   Id. at 602.   
 99.   Id. 
 100.   Id. at 603.   
 101.   Id. at 630.  Judge Furman cited the Bank of New York Mellon and the 
Countrywide cases in addition to relying on the plain meaning of the statute (“The question 
considered by courts in these cases was whether a financial institution, through its own 
misconduct, can affect itself within the meaning of FIRREA.  Courts have repeatedly held 
that it can.”).  Id.  Arguably, this makes sense since the primary purpose of FIRREA is 
punitive rather than compensatory.  Despite the fact that civil liability is imposed under 
FIRREA, the fines serve a punitive function.  Therefore, the defendant can be punished for 
misconduct even when compensatory damages would be nonsensical (e.g., if the fine was 
paid to the “affected” party, the defendant would be compensating itself).   
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D. United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies 
The most recent case to be brought by the DOJ is United States v. 
McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc.  In this case, the DOJ alleged that Standard & Poor 
(S&P) engaged in mail and wire fraud in their rating of MBSs in the time 
leading up to the GFC.  The complaint alleged that S&P made several 
significant misrepresentations.  S&P represented that their ratings were 
objective, independent and uninfluenced by any conflicts of interest.  In 
fact, they represented that they had internal controls and policies in place to 
address conflicts of interest in ratings.  At the same time, they failed to 
disclose that they were receiving fees from the issuer of the Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) and MBSs.   The complaint alleged that S&P 
knew that the ratings inaccurately rated the riskiness of the tranches and 
failed to modify the ratings out of a desire for increased revenue and 
market share.102  The complaint outlined how S&P refused to downgrade 
their ratings or to revise the models used to set these ratings even as 
employees within the company expressed fears that their ratings were 
inaccurate.  Moreover, the complaint outlined how the affected financial 
institutions relied on these ratings in their investment decisions. 
S&P raised a number of issues in a motion to dismiss.  They argued 
that any representations that their ratings were independent and objective 
were “generalized aspirational language and ‘puffery,’”103 that the 
complaint failed to specify fraud with sufficient particularity and that the 
complaint failed to allege that S&P acted with specific intent to defraud the 
investors of the MBSs.  In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss,104 
Judge David O. Carter rejected the “puffery” argument.  He held that the 
representations by the CRA were not “‘general, subjective claim[s]’ about 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest,” but instead were “specific assertions 
of current and ongoing policies.”105 Moreover, the court found that it is not 
necessary for a FIRREA claim that the money flow directly from the party 
deceived to the defendant.  In other words, S&P argued that even if they 
 
 102.    Complaint for Civil Money Penalties & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, United States 
v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., CV 13-00779 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter McGraw Hill 
Complaint].  For further discussion of the facts in this case, see id. at 107 (discussing S&P’s 
alleged mail and wire fraud in the time preceding the GFC).   
 103.   Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 7, United States v. McGraw Hill 
Cos., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00779-DOC-JCG (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) [hereinafter Order 
Denying].  See United States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) at 1, No. 2:13-cv-00779-DOC-
JCG (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (opposing this argument, the DOJ equates this to “an 
infomercial hawker’s claim that his knife will outlast any other.”).   
 104.   Order Denying, supra note 103. 
 105.   Id. at 9-10.   
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benefitted from fraud that they were paid by the issuers of the securities, 
not by the parties deceived (the investors).  In rejecting this argument, the 
court relied on assertions in the complaint that S&P was engaged in a 
“scheme to defraud investors,” they knew this scheme would defraud 
investors and that S&P would obtain money from the investors as the costs 
of issuing ratings were passed through to the investors.106 
The government sought damages in the amount of $5 billion.  On 
February 3, 2015, a settlement was reached between the parties in which 
S&P agreed to pay $1.375 billion.107  While admitting that business 
concerns affected rating decisions108 and that S&P executives purposely 
delayed adopting new models that might have lowered ratings,109 S&P did 
not admit fault.110  As part of the settlement, S&P was banned by the SEC 
from rating certain types of new MBS transactions until 2016.111 
E. Lessons Learned 
What can we learn from these four lawsuits?  We see the power of 
FIRREA.  Although it has been rarely used since the S&L Crisis, it is 
presently a formidable weapon.112  Courts have by and large rejected the 
 
 106.   Id. at 17.  
 107.   Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and State Partners Secure 
$1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the 
Financial Crisis (Feb. 3, 2015) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-
partners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-defrauding-investors, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z7SB-MH8H.   
 108.   Kaja Whitehouse, Critics Blast Justice Department’s S&P Settlement, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/02/03/sp-settlement-
14b-wrongdoing-change/22808017/, archived at http://perma.cc/UNZ6-62YR.  
 109.   Addison Morris, DOJ announces $1.375 billion settlement with S&P, JURIST (Feb. 
3, 2015), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/02/doj-announces-1375-billion-settlement-with-
sp.php.  See Department of Justice Press Release, supra note 107 (indicating that S&P 
acknowledged that: 1) they promised investors that its ratings were independent and 
objective; 2) decisions about testing and timing of updates to the ratings models were based, 
at least in part, on concerns about ongoing business relationships with issuers; 3) people in 
S&P knew that many of the underlying loans were delinquent and that losses were likely; 
and 4) S&P representatives continued to issue positive ratings without adjustments). 
 110.   Samantha Sharf, S&P To Pay $1.5 Billion In Settlements With DOJ, 
States, CalPERS (FORBES, Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2015/02/03/sp-to-pay-1-5-billion-in-
settlements-with-doj-states-calpers/, archived at http://perma.cc/EY2P-NLYL See, e.g., 
Edvard Pettersson, S&P Faces Squeeze After $1.3 Billion Countrywide Fine, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 
9, 2014) (explaining that there had been speculation that S&P would settle after the 
Countrywide fine was announced).   
 111.   Whitehouse, supra note 108.   
 112.   See Russell-Kraft, supra note 54 (featuring Acting Associate Attorney General 
Stuart Delery discussing the S&P settlement by stating, “In this case, the department once 
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arguments by financial institution defendants that FIRREA does not apply 
to them because they are both the defendant and the victim of fraud and 
instead adopted the self-affecting theory.  This theory allows the DOJ to 
bring FIRREA claims against financial institution defendants when their 
actions injured the profitability of the defendant.  Moreover, in the S&P 
lawsuit we see that the DOJ does not need to prove any direct 
communication between the affected financial institution and the 
defendant.  In the S&P case, it was enough for the DOJ to assert that 
financial institutions relied on the ratings issued by the defendant.  Some 
see this as a “significant expansion of FIRREA’s reach.”113 
The DOJ has demonstrated that FIRREA is an effective weapon.  On 
the heels of the Countrywide verdict, DOJ has settled case after case. In the 
summer of 2015, they reached a $16.65 billion settlement with Bank of 
America, $5 billion of which was to settle FIRREA claims; they reached a 
$4 billion settlement with Citigroup and a $2 billion settlement with JP 
Morgan Chase and Co.114 It is possible that the potential for huge liability 
will induce other defendants to enter into settlements.115 Moreover, as an 
example of the far-reaching potential of FIRREA, there is speculation that 
the DOJ is considering initiating FIRREA suits against lenders involved in 
granting and securitizing subprime automobile loans.116 
 
again has demonstrated that FIRREA is a powerful weapon for combating financial fraud 
and a vital mechanism for holding accountable those who violate the law.”). 
 113.   Latham & Watkins Litigation Department, The DOJ’s Case Against Standard & 
Poor’s and the Continued Rise of FIRREA as a Tool for Government Enforcement, LATHAM 





KfCm0BofZCFbXBQ8dIw, archived at https://perma.cc/N5TC-G8LR?type=source.  
 114.   Russell-Kraft, supra note 54.   
 115.   See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate 
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 113 (2006) (hypothesizing that the complications of 
determining whether individuals or corporations act with the scienter requirement may 
encourage settlement); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1418-1419 (2009) (emphasizing that the 
difficulties that arise when applying criminal liabilities to corporations may lead to 
settlement); Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1319, (2007) (noting that one of the dangers of imposing criminal liability in 
the instance of corporate crime is thought to be the over-inclusiveness that comes from the 
stigma of criminal liability).  In other words, some commentators argue that corporations 
enter into settlements in the case of criminal liability even when they are not in fact guilty.  
Arguably, this concern of over-inclusiveness might apply to FIRREA liability.   
 116.   Financial Services Report, Morrison Foerster, (Spring 2015), 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/Newsletter/2015/03/150309FinancialServicesReport.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/YPZ4-P58L. 
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IV. FIRREA:  SOUND PUBLIC POLICY? 
A. The Public Policy of Financial Regulation 
The availability of credit is essential to the smooth functioning of 
financial markets, and investor confidence is essential to the availability of 
credit.117  If investors do not have confidence that the risks of their 
investments are relatively transparent and free from fraud, they will not 
invest in the market.118   The issuers, however, often know more about their 
business operations and future prospects, and as such, are in a position to 
take advantage of investors by not disclosing relevant information.119  This 
creates a situation of asymmetric information,120 which can hinder the 
investment choices that consumers make.  This in turn creates the lemons 
problem.121  In his now classic example, Professor Akerlof illustrates how 
information asymmetry creates an adverse selection problem.122   This 
 
 117.   One of the purposes of FIRREA was to restore confidence in the regulatory 
system.  See, e.g., Michael M. Neltner, Government Scapegoating, Duty to Disclose, and the 
S & L Crisis: Can Lawyers and Accountants Avoid Liability in the Savings and Loan 
Wilderness, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 662 (1993) (arguing that President Bush became aware 
of the need to restore confidence in the regulatory system in the wake of the 1988 
presidential election).   
 118.   Capital markets function when funds flow from investors to issuers in an efficient 
manner.  This results in optimal allocation of resources in the economy.  Fraud interferes 
with efficient allocation.  For more details on the idea of efficient allocation, see, e.g., 
ANTHONY SANTOMERO & DAVID BABBEL, FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTRUMENTS & 
INSTITUTIONS 39-52 (2001) (describing the role interest rates play in allocation of 
resources).  For example, it was estimated that the loss of consumer confidence in the 
integrity of capital markets following Enron led to a loss of over $8 trillion in U.S. equity 
markets from 2001 to 2002.  Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried 
Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.  321, 323 
(2007).   
 119.   Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. 
OF ACCOUNTING & ECON. 405, 407 (2001). 
 120.   See Stephanie Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: 
The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L. J. 617, 622 (2006) (“Inevitably, 
information asymmetry exists in the debt market because issuers have superior information 
regarding their creditworthiness than do investors.”); White, supra note 19, at 4 (“The 
critical problem is one of asymmetric information: the borrower usually knows more about 
the prospects for repayment than does the lender.”).   
 121.   See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining how the presence of 
information asymmetry can lead to the degradation of goods offered within a market). 
 122.   Assume that a consumer is interested in buying lemons but he cannot tell a bad 
lemon from a good lemon.  Therefore, he is willing to pay an average price for the lemon.  
This rewards sellers of bad lemons (the adverse selection) and promotes the sale of more 
bad lemons than good lemons.  Assuming that consumers are rational, they anticipate this 
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applies to capital markets and creates a situation where if investors cannot 
judge the value of an investment, they assume that they are being offered a 
“lemon” and are unwilling to pay a high price for that investment.  In other 
words, if investors lack sufficient information to judge the value of a 
security, they will assume it is a risky or low-value investment and either 
fail to purchase that security or price it accordingly.  If that happens, there 
is potential for a breakdown in capital flows which will impede economic 
growth.123 
Financial regulation is designed to address the lemons problem with 
overall aims of protecting investors and encouraging investment in 
financial markets. 124 It does this by requiring disclosure and by banning 
fraud.125  The disclosure requirements are far-reaching; they are intended to 
 
adverse selection and lower the price at which they are willing to buy lemons.  This, in turn, 
promotes the sale of more bad lemons.  Id.  See also Yossi Spiegel, Topic 4: Asymmetric 
Information Models of Capital Structure 1 (unpublished lesson overview) 
(www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/teaching/corpfin/Topic4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SM9-
GWQT) (applying Akerlof’s lemons theory to corporate finance).   
 123.   Healy & Palepu, supra note 119, at 408 (discussing how the lemons problem can 
lead to a breakdown in capital markets).  Rousseau explains that one result of this 
information asymmetry is that it can lead to “an adverse selection problem in that the debt of 
issuers with good credit quality will be undervalued, thereby undermining the viability of 
the market.”  Rousseau, supra note 120, at 623.   
 124.   The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SECURITIES EXCH. COMM’N ( 
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate] (“The mission of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation”) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate].  
See generally Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s 
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 990 (2006) (“[T]he 
SEC is charged with ensuring that investors are sufficiently confident in the integrity of 
securities markets so that they do not withdraw from the market.”).   
 125.   Thomas Lee Hazan, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: 
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 383 (“Disclosure rather than a merit approach remains the 
regulatory philosophy of the federal securities laws today.”).  The theory is that if risks are 
made transparent that investors would properly price all risks.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 218 (1994) (discussing this 
theory).  See also Investor’s Advocate, supra note 124 (“The laws and rules that govern the 
securities industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all 
investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain 
basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it.  To achieve 
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other 
information to the public.  This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to 
use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security.  Only through 
the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound 
investment decisions. . . .  Here the SEC is concerned primarily with promoting disclosure 
of important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against 
fraud.”).  Finance scholars recognize that disclosure is essential to a proper functioning 
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address the quality of the securities offered and indirectly regulate the 
management of the issuer companies.126  Disclosure encourages firms to 
make credible commitments to investors, which then results in allocation of 
capital to investors who will make the best use of it.127 Moreover, it 
provides an opportunity for investors to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors by offering sufficient information about the quality of the 
investment.128  The overarching goal of financial and banking regulation is 
to make capital available in the long run.129  Therefore, we want banks and 
other lending institutions to be cautious in their lending practices (to protect 
investment in those institutions) and we want issuers of securities to be 
transparent and free from fraud.130 
How does FIRREA work to achieve these overriding objectives?  By 
allowing civil action for violation of specified criminal statutes involving 
crimes affecting financial institutions, FIRREA promotes the anti-fraud 
aims of financial regulation.  Perhaps more importantly, the recent use of 
FIRREA against wrongdoers whose behavior contributed to the GFC has to 
some degree worked to restore investor confidence in the market.  When 
investors perceive that massive financial fraud has gone unpunished they 
assume that such fraud will continue and are reluctant to invest.  By 
enforcing anti-fraud statutes, investors and public confidence is restored. 
As a hybrid statute, FIRREA blurs the line between civil and criminal 
law.  While liability is imposed only when the government can prove that 
the defendant violated one of the listed criminal statutes, the penalties 
 
capital market.  See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough: The 
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 231 (2002) (dividing disclosure 
requirements into antifraud prohibitions and mandatory disclosure requirements).   
 126.   See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: 
Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 886 (2006) (“Historically the SEC’s 
regulation of management through the federal securities laws was indirect because it was 
based on disclosure.”).   
 127.   Jonathan Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 591, 592 (2013).   
 128.   Id. 
 129.   See, e.g., Kao, supra note 34(recognizing the need for liquidity and the need to 
prevent the type of liquidity crises that would result from bank runs).   
 130.   Some have argued, however, that too much regulation might actually restrict the 
availability of credit.  Thus, when FIRREA was enacted, some argued that it would make 
lenders too cautious in their lending practices and limit the availability of credit.  The 
resulting “credit crunch” would be contrary to the public policy meant to be supported.  See, 
e.g., Rowlett, supra note 9, at 253 (“There is no doubt that FIRREA . . . [has] made lenders 
more cautious in their lending.  This takes for form of curtailing credit and exercising more 
diligence in documentation.”).  Rowlett was concerned primarily with unintended 
consequences of limiting lending by banks. Most of this article has, instead, focused on the 
application of FIRREA to financial institutions not as lenders but as issuers of securities.   
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imposed are said to be civil in nature.  While the public policy objectives 
served by imposition of civil liability differ from those of criminal law, 
there is significant overlap; this overlap is illustrated by FIRREA.  Thus, 
the questions become: what are the public policy objectives of civil and 
criminal law, does FIRREA fulfill those objectives, and how will it serve 
the overarching objectives of financial regulation? 
B. FIRREA:  The Nature of a FIRREA Case and the Issue of 
Procedural Safeguards. 
1. Legal Categories 
FIRREA offers one way of achieving the broader policy objectives of 
financial and banking regulation.  A complete policy assessment of 
FIRREA requires, however, that we move beyond the area of financial 
services industry regulation and consider more basic principles of 
substantive law.  In this section we first analyze the noteworthy features of 
FIRREA using the conventional divisions of civil law, criminal law, and 
administrative law.  A cursory review of FIRREA reveals that while it 
exhibits some features of each it does not neatly fit into any one of these 
conventional categories.  In this section, we will consider the hybrid nature 
of the statute by examining who initiates the action, the type of sanctions 
imposed as well as some procedural features of the statute.  As part of this 
analysis, we will consider the broad public policy objectives of criminal, 
civil, and administrative law and conclude that this type of analysis is 
actually unproductive.  That leads us to consider the much more important 
issue of procedural safeguards available to a defendant in a FIRREA case. 
i. FIRREA as Civil Law 
Under FIRREA, liability is imposed only where the government can 
prove that the defendant violated one of the listed federal criminal statutes, 
but the sanctions imposed appear to be more civil than criminal in nature.  
Incarceration, the hallmark of a criminal statute,131 is conspicuously absent.  
The sum of money that a defendant has to pay under FIRREA for violating 
one or more of the predicate statutes has some characteristics of a criminal 
fine, some characteristics of an administrative fine, and some (perhaps the 
fewest) characteristics of money damages in a civil case. 
 
 131.   See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“[C]riminal punishment, with emphasis on imprisonment, is on the whole more drastic than 
the sanctions, with emphasis upon paying money, imposed by the civil law . . . .”).  See also 
id. at 54 (discussing administrative fines). 
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One of the hallmarks of civil liability is its compensatory nature; the 
money damage judgments imposed on defendants primarily serve to 
compensate injured plaintiffs.132  This is one of the key characteristics that 
sets civil liability apart from criminal liability.133  FIRREA does not appear 
to serve this compensatory goal because it assesses a sum of money that is 
paid to the government rather than providing for compensatory damages to 
be paid to the injured parties.134  In other words, the fines imposed do not 
operate to compensate innocent investors who suffered losses because of 
financial fraud.  The non-compensatory nature of the financial penalties is a 
characteristic of a criminal statute: the fines are paid to the government, not 
to the victim of the criminal act.  At the same time, however, the sum of 
money a defendant would have to pay to the government under FIRREA is 
intended, at least in part, to help compensate the federal government for the 
substantial expenses it incurred in enforcing criminal statutes and 
regulations governing the financial services industry.  In both the savings 
and loan crisis and the GFC, the government incurred substantial losses in 
bailing out the financial sector.  Recall that the maximum fine imposed 
under FIRREA is at least tangentially tied to the amount of the 
government’s loss.135  A FIRREA recovery, although not expressly tied to 
the amounts of the bailouts, does provide a way to at least partly 
compensate the government, if not the investors injured, for these losses.136 
Another noteworthy feature of FIRREA is the standard of proof 
required in an action under the statute: preponderance of evidence.  This 
standard of proof, which is nearly universal in civil cases137 and is typical in 
 
 132.   Id. at 22.  
 133.   As an example of the overlap between civil and criminal policy, it should be noted 
that punitive damages in a civil case are designed to punish (specifically to deter) defendants 
in a case of particularly egregious behavior.  Such cases must be proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Punitive damages are an accepted part of tort law and serve a legitimate 
purpose. 
 134.   One important feature of criminal law is that any financial penalties imposed are 
paid as fines to the government, not to the injured party as compensation.  Restitution to the 
victim of the crime is, however, becoming more common in the array of sanctions available 
to the judge in a criminal case.  Professor LaFave writes: “In spite of the theory that criminal 
law is not concerned with compensating the victim of crime, in practice restitution of 
property obtained by theft is sometimes, with or without statutory authority, made a 
condition of probation . . . .”  LaFave, supra note 131, at 22, n.5. 
 135.   See supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating that for the purposes of 
calculating the civil fine, losses include those suffered by the various Federal depository 
insurance programs).   
 136.   See Lowy, supra note 5, at 379 (discussing an effort in the 1980s by federal 
regulators to “recoup a portion of the billions of federal dollars lost in the bankruptcy of 
federally-insured banks and thrifts . . . .”).  
 137.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 25. 
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administrative law cases,138 is justified in civil cases because the absence of 
punitive sanctions and the emphasis on compensation minimize the concern 
over a possible erroneous outcome. 
This analysis has demonstrated that while FIRREA has some of the 
key characteristics of a civil statute, most notably its standard of proof, it 
fails to serve the overriding public policy goal of compensating the victims.  
Hence, the non-compensatory nature of the statute’s remedial provision and 
the fact that the financial penalty is paid to the government require that we 
consider whether or not FIRREA better fits within the category of criminal 
law. 
ii. FIRREA as Criminal Law 
Traditionally, civil law existed as an alternative to criminal law.  As 
we have demonstrated, FIRREA does not fit neatly into the category of 
civil liability.  The question thus becomes: to what extent is FIRREA more 
appropriately viewed as a criminal statute and does it better meet the public 
policy objectives of criminal law?  One of the hallmarks of modern 
criminal law is that prosecutions to enforce the criminal code are brought 
by the government, typically by a prosecutor acting on behalf of the 
public.139  This is the case with a FIRREA action which may only be 
initiated by the federal government, not by private parties.  This is a 
traditional characteristic of both criminal law and modern administrative 
law and distinguishes the statute from a typical civil action that is brought 
by a private party plaintiff. 
Another hallmark of criminal law is the fact that criminal law is 
intended to punish wrongdoers.140  This punishment serves a variety of 
public policy purposes such as deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.141  
 
 138.   2 RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 971(5th ed. 2010). 
 139.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 22.  While private prosecutions were once typical in 
Anglo-American law, by the middle of the nineteenth century public prosecution became 
the norm.  See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function 
to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411 (2009) (discussing the public prosecution 
norm); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecutor to Plea Bargaining: Criminal 
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
568 (1984) (describing the authoritative role of the public prosecutor in the American 
criminal justice system). 
 140.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 18 (Criminal law aims to “prevent harm to society.”  
“This it accomplishes by punishing those who have done harm, and by threatening with 
punishment those who would do harm, to others.”). 
 141.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 36-47; Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability 
versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability: Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of 
Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 170 (2009) (“The goals of imposing corporate 
criminal liability are retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”).  Some argue that 
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As such, the fines and other sanctions (such as incarceration) are imposed 
to punish defendants who are found guilty of engaging in criminal 
behavior.142  FIRREA serves this punitive function.  Judge Rakoff in the 
Countrywide/Bank of America case noted that “a FIRREA action is not 
primarily intended to serve compensatory functions but rather to serve 
quasi-civil punitive and deterrent functions.”143  There is no threat of 
imprisonment; the fine serves as the entirety of the punishment.144  The 
absence of this threat is not determinative because there are many fine-only 
criminal statutes.145  Incarceration is a sanction that is found only in 
criminal law, but it is not a necessary condition of a criminal statute.  
Insofar as criminal statutes are applied to corporate defendants, 
incarceration as a punishment is impossible.  This is not to suggest that the 
absence of incarceration as a sanction is unimportant.  As we will discuss 
in Part 2 of this section, the absence of incarceration as a sanction is very 
significant with respect to the issue of procedural safeguards.146 
Another hallmark of a criminal law is its location in the jurisdiction’s 
codes.  Criminal law is placed in the criminal code, which in federal law is 
 
rehabilitation is one of the justifications for punishing, so is deterrence.  By contrast, some 
reject these justifications and argue that punishment should bring about retribution (for 
engaging in morally wrong behavior).  See Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: 
Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 109 (2010) (discussing the merits of retribution and deterrence as goals of 
organizational criminal liability).   
 142.   Kircher, supra note 141, at 170 (“The goals of imposing corporate criminal 
liability are retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”); Robson, supra note 141.  For a 
discussion of the difference between damages awarded in civil suits and fines imposed in 
the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of 
Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (“Just as fines fail to express condemnation 
relative to imprisonment of natural persons, so civil damages fail to express it relative to 
criminal liability for corporations.  Indeed, like fines, civil damages seem to connote that 
society is ‘pricing’ corporate crime.”).   
 143.   Countrywide Opinion and Order, supra note 86, at 5.  See also id. at 11 (noting the 
punitive and deterrent nature of FIRREA’s civil penalty provisions).  
 144.   This is not unusual in the case of corporate crime.  Retribution is an important 
public policy goal furthered by imposition of criminal penalties upon corporations.  See 
Kircher, supra note 141, at 170 (“the fine is meant to be proportional to the harm committed 
by the corporate offender in an effort to satisfy the public’s demand for justice.”).  See 
generally Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000) (discussing the purpose of corporate criminal liability); Robson, 
supra note 141 (discussing criminal law as the ultimate deterrent to corporate crime).  In the 
case of corporate crime, however, retribution is achieved largely through assessment of a 
fine on the corporation.  
 145.   These are mainly minor misdemeanors.  See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318 (2001) (equating a fine-only offense with a misdemeanor). 
 146.   See infra notes 166-174 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the 
lack of incarceration as an important element of a consideration of the procedural safeguards 
required).  
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found in Title 18 of the United States Code.  FIRREA appears in Title 12, 
which weighs heavily against classifying it as a criminal statute.  This is 
not merely playing with labels.  Other than the threat of incarceration and 
placement in the criminal code, there are no other unambiguous 
characteristics of criminal law. 
Criminal law also serves an important deterrent function.  As a 
justification for imposition of criminal penalties, deterrence is traditionally 
broken down into specific and general deterrence.147  Specific deterrence is 
intended to deter this particular defendant from committing criminal acts in 
the future; general deterrence is intended to deter other similarly situated 
individuals from engaging in similar misconduct.148  FIRREA is intended to 
serve a deterrent effect.  Its legislative history makes it clear that one of the 
“primary purposes of [FIRREA was to] . . . enhance the regulatory 
enforcement powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to 
protect against fraud . . . .”149 
In order to establish liability under FIRREA the government must 
prove that the defendant violated one of the specified federal criminal 
statutes, i.e. predicate offenses.  The use in FIRREA of existing criminal 
statutes to establish standards of behavior is, in fact, part of the established 
practice of attaching civil liability to conduct that falls below standards 
established in criminal statutes.150  The use in civil cases of standards of 
behavior established in criminal statutes is not surprising because despite 
their differences, both criminal law and civil law aim “to shape people’s 
conduct along lines that are beneficial to society . . . .”151  Once a legislature 
identifies conduct as deserving moral condemnation and labels it criminal 
(by placing the statute in the criminal code, e.g. Title 18 of the United 
States Code), the subsequent step of imposing civil liability for engaging in 
that same behavior (with proof by a preponderance of evidence) is 
 
 147.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 37-40. 
 148.   Id. at 37-38; Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an 
Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 41, 54 (2012); 
Weissmann, supra note 115, at 1325. 
 149.   H.R. Rep. 101-54(I), at 307-08 (1989).  See also Judge Kaplan’s comments supra 
note 81 and accompanying text (holding a federally insured financial institution civilly 
liable under FIRREA).  See generally John Leubsdorf, Symposium on James Atleson’s 
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective 
Article: Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 974 (2009) (stating that FIRREA 
was passed “both to help clean up the savings and loan mess and to prevent future 
disasters”). 
 150.   For example, many jurisdictions hold that violation of a criminal statute is 
negligence per se (“or at least evidence of negligence”) in an action brought by someone 
who is among those intended to be protected by that statute.  LaFave, supra note 131, at 25-
26. 
 151.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 21.  
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relatively unproblematic.  In the case of FIRREA, instead of the courts 
using a statute to establish a standard of behavior with which to impose 
common law liability (e.g., for fraud), Congress is using its own criminal 
statutes (in U.S.C. Title 18) to establish a standard of behavior to impose 
statutory civil liability (under U.S.C. Title 12).  For this reason, FIRREA’s 
use of existing criminal statutes in no way compels us to classify it as a 
criminal law. 
In a FIRREA case, the government can prevail by proving its case by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  This standard of proof makes considering 
FIRREA as a criminal statute problematic.  This is because one of the most 
significant features of a criminal prosecution is the requirement that the 
government prove its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The place this traditional safeguard has in a criminal prosecution 
was recognized by the end of the eighteenth century and was confirmed 
more than four decades ago by the Supreme Court in In re Winship.152  The 
conventional justification for this high standard of proof is that the severe 
penalties that might be imposed on a defendant who is convicted of a 
crime, namely incarceration and possibly the death penalty, civil 
disabilities such as denial of the right to vote, along with the stigma that 
attaches to a criminal conviction, mandate that extreme measures be taken 
to avoid an erroneous conviction.153  In other words, the highest standard of 
proof provides a high level of confidence to society (on whose behalf the 
prosecution is undertaken) that the array of severe penalties is imposed on a 
defendant only when there is a very high level of confidence of that 
defendant’s guilt.  The absence of a requirement in FIRREA of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt highlights the critical question in this analysis:  
does the significantly lower standard of proof (preponderance of evidence) 
signify that the statute does not fall into the conventional category of 
criminal law, or does it suggest that FIRREA is a defective criminal statute 
because it lacks an important procedural safeguard?  It has already been 
 
 152.   In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970), the Court stated that “[t]he requirement 
that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at 
least from our early years as a Nation.”  The Court also noted that “[i]t is now accepted in 
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must 
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.”  Id. at 361 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-2 (1954)). 
The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is seen as “a prime instrument for reducing 
the risk of convictions resting on factual error.  The standard provides concrete substance 
for the presumption of innocence . . . .” Id. at 363.  Although the Court did not limit its 
holding to criminal cases in which the defendant was convicted and incarcerated, id. at 364, 
it is abundantly clear that the majority of the court was primarily concerned about a 
mistaken conviction resulting in imprisonment and the stigmatization that accompanies a 
criminal conviction.  Id. at 363-64. 
 153.   Id.  
ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  2:52 PM 
2015] USE OF FIRREA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY 153 
 
suggested that while FIRREA embodies some features of a criminal statute, 
it also embodies some features of civil law.  Moreover, because it lacks the 
threat of incarceration and stigma associated with criminal law, it cannot 
comfortably be classified as a criminal law.  The presence of the lowest 
standard of proof is an important additional reason.  At the same time, this 
lower standard of proof does raise the important issue of procedural 
safeguards.154 
This brief examination of FIRREA within the conventional categories 
of criminal law and civil law reveals that while its purpose fits within the 
“broad aim of the criminal law,” namely, preventing harm to the public,155 
and it exhibits some of the hallmarks of a criminal law, it does not fit neatly 
into that category.  At the same time, we also see that while it exhibits 
some of the hallmarks of a civil liability statute, it does not fit neatly into 
that category either.  However, civil law and criminal law do not exhaust 
the major categories of modern American law.  Over the last century 
administrative law has become an increasingly important area of law, in 
some ways surpassing the importance of the more traditional areas.  It is to 
this category that we now turn in our analysis of FIRREA. 
iii. FIRREA as Administrative Law 
A conventional analysis of FIRREA should not be limited to the 
traditional categories of civil law and criminal law.  American 
administrative law was established over a century ago and it occupies a 
dominant position in American law.156  The history and the public policies 
underlying administrative law make it appropriate to include it in the 
analysis of FIRREA.  In fact, FIRREA comports with many features of 
administrative law.  Given the circumstances that led up to its enactment, 
 
 154.   See infra notes 165-175 and accompanying text (comparing the burden of proof 
used in criminal law with the burden used in administrative law).   
 155.   WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW HORNBOOK SERIES 10 (2000). 
 156.   For background on the history of American administrative law, see generally 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 120-29, 329-49, 559-63 (3d. Ed. 
2005) [hereinafter Friedman, History] (providing background information on the history of 
American administrative law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 59-67 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, American Law] (describing the emergence of 
state and local regulations in response to numerous public health and safety problems); 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS 8-32 (6th Ed. 2014) (outlining the various justifications for administrative law and 
the changing interpretations of the role of government regulations); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 28-35 (3d. Ed. 1991) (summarizing the major changes in 
administrative law in the United States during the twentieth century).  Federal agencies 
adjudicate far more disputes each year than do federal courts. PIERCE, supra note 138, at 
909. 
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this is not surprising.  FIRREA is a potent tool provided to federal bank and 
financial services regulators to prevent harm to the public through the 
imposition of the sanctions permitted by the statute.  Seen from this 
perspective, FIRREA is neither extraordinary nor at odds with the 
underlying policy objectives of administrative law.  Administrative actions 
are brought by the government, as is the case with an action under 
FIRREA, which is brought by the DOJ, an executive 
agency.  Administrative fines are imposed on those found to be in violation 
of relevant standards of behavior.  The fine is not compensatory in nature 
and must be paid to the government, not to an individual who was injured 
as the result of the defendant’s actions.  This is largely descriptive of the 
sanctions imposed under FIRREA.  Finally and perhaps most importantly, 
the standard of proof in FIRREA is preponderance of evidence, which is 
the default standard in administrative law.157  A standard of proof that is 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the key features that 
distinguishes administrative law from criminal law. 
Finding that FIRREA loosely fits within the model of administrative 
law raises the question of whether is promotes the policy goals of 
administrative law.  The rise of the administrative state, starting mainly in 
the nineteenth century, was in response to the perception that conventional 
criminal law and civil law processes were inadequate to effectively deal 
with an array of social and economic problems that arose during that 
period.158  Shifting the problem of worker injuries away from tort litigation 
in civil courts is just one example.159  Conventional legal processes, both 
civil and criminal, were judged to be inadequate to effectively deal with 
these problems.  In enacting FIRREA, Congress expressed the policy that 
existing civil law and criminal law processes were inadequate to deal with 
the significant wrongful behavior that had been occurring and was feared to 
continue to occur in the banking and financial services industries.  There is 
no doubt that Congress has the authority to shift to administrative-like 
 
 157.   See infra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court 
generally requires only a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in 
administrative proceedings, absent a statutory mandate dictating otherwise).  See also 
Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 68 (discussing the fact that Congress considered 
imposing a higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence). 
 158.   This story is told in Pierce’s administrative law treatise, among many other 
sources.  See, e.g., PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at 6-20 (explaining the 
objectives of administrative law with reference to specific problems addressed by 
government regulations). 
 159.   See generally FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 156, at 516-18 (summarizing the 
introduction of the workers’ compensation system); FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 
156, at 62, 353-55, 361-64, 539-40 (providing further background information on transition 
towards the workers’ compensation system). 
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measures such as those contained in FIRREA to address these problems 
and doing so does not raise issues of fundamental fairness.   
It is tempting to view FIRREA through the lens of administrative law.  
Several key features of FIRREA are routinely found in that area of law.  
However, administrative law ultimately does not provide a perfect 
framework within which to analyze FIRREA.  The main reason for this 
conclusion is that the standards of behavior which are the subject of a 
FIRREA enforcement action are not embodied in agency regulations.  They 
are embodied in federal criminal statutes.  As a result, the enormous body 
of case law and scholarly commentary that deals with whether agency 
rules, which are the subject of enforcement actions, go beyond the scope of 
the agency’s authority is irrelevant.  The vulnerably of some agency rules 
to the claim that they are ultra vires is completely avoided in FIRREA 
because these standards of conduct are embodied in federal criminal 
statutes and as such cannot be challenged under the array of theories that 
agency rules can be challenged. 
Thus far this section has been organized around an effort to ascertain 
whether FIRREA fits into one of the conventional categories into which 
law is routinely divided.  This effort was based on the assumption that the 
statute has to fit within one of these categories, and if it does not, then the 
statute is flawed and its enforcement problematic.  Recall that some 
commentators have argued that FIRREA is flawed because it is essentially 
a criminal statute stripped of the procedural safeguards associated with 
criminal law.  It is submitted, however, that the assumption that FIRREA 
must fit within a conventional category is itself flawed.  The apparent 
failure of FIRREA to fit within an existing legal category is not significant 
because there is no inherent need for it to fit within one of these categories.  
As lawyers and legal scholars, we are so used to thinking about law along 
these lines that we come to believe (at an early point in law school) that 
these categories are necessary, that they are inherent in the nature of law.  
The fact of the matter is that these categories are conventional.  Writing 
about the distinction between public and private law that exists within the 
civil law tradition, John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Perez-Perdomo state 
that “[t]he conventional way of dividing the law becomes part of the law 
itself, affecting the way that law is formulated and applied.”160  The public 
law-private law distinction “seems to most civil lawyers to be fundamental, 
necessary, and, on the whole, evident.”161  These authors suggest that 
lawyers within the common law tradition “tend to think of the division of 
 
 160.   JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 91 (3d Ed. 2007). 
 161.   See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 160, at 92 (“They know that public 
law and private law are essentially different.”).   
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law as conventional . . . ,”162 but this gives common law lawyers far more 
credit than they deserve.  Common law lawyers, like civil lawyers, have 
created their own sets of intellectual straitjackets.  Common law lawyers 
tend to think of the civil law–criminal law distinction as “fundamental, 
necessary, and, on the whole, evident.”  This results in calling into question 
a statute like FIRREA because it does not easily fit into one of these 
categories. 
The assumption on which the conventional analysis is based, i.e. that a 
law must fall within the established categories of civil law, criminal law, or 
administrative law is very similar to the assumption that resulted in a 
decades-long struggle over the origin and development of administrative 
law.  The belief that established categories of traditional substantive law 
and the procedures that were linked to them could not effectively deal with 
the array of significant problems facing federal, state, and local 
governments and the corresponding effort to fashion a modern 
administrative regime to remedy these problems, were met by an onslaught 
of criticism that doing so would upend the natural order of the legal world.  
The critics argued that established legal categories were the only ways in 
which legal reality could be perceived and that any other arrangement 
would have dire consequences.163 
The fundamental question regarding FIRREA is not whether the 
statute falls within the categories of civil law, criminal law, or 
administrative law.  The fundamental question in the analysis of FIRREA 
is whether or not Congress can or should authorize an executive agency of 
the federal government (the DOJ) to bring an action to enforce standards of 
behavior contained in existing criminal statutes and specify that if it can be 
proved by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated those 
standards, then financial penalties, which may be substantial, can be 
assessed against that defendant.  The purpose of FIRREA is not to make 
any changes in the targeted conduct; FIRREA targets exactly the same 
conduct that is targeted in the predicate statutes.164  Instead, the enactment 
 
 162.   Id. at 91.   
 163.   PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at 8-23. 
 164.   Approaching this matter from a very different perspective, Richard Epstein 
presents an interesting analysis on the relationship between tort and criminal law.  He argues 
that the decision to utilize the civil law tort system or the criminal system is not a critical 
one.  The critical, threshold decision is whether specific conduct should be prohibited.  In 
his view, far too much conduct is prohibited.  But, for him, once we decide that specific 
conduct should be prohibited, the question of whether to do so through the civil tort system 
or through the criminal justice system is not an important one.  His preference is for using 
the tort system, but he readily acknowledges that there are a number of inefficiencies in the 
tort system that call for using the criminal justice system in certain situations. Richard A. 
Epstein, Symposium: The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1 
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of FIRREA reflects Congress’s judgment that the original sanctioning 
mechanism—the criminal justice system—was inadequate and needed to be 
supplemented with an alternative sanctioning mechanism.  It happens that 
this alternative sanctioning mechanism shares a number of characteristics 
with civil law and administrative law.  This bypasses the issue of how to 
categorize the statute and instead raises the important issue of procedural 
safeguards. 
2. Procedural Safeguards 
Recall that some critics of FIRREA contend that it resembles a 
criminal statute more than a civil statute.165  The concern expressed is that 
FIRREA is in essence a criminal statute, imposing criminal sanctions but 
without the procedural safeguards afforded by criminal law.  The 
fundamental fairness of FIRREA is thus called into question.  Instead of 
thinking about civil law, criminal law, and administrative law as distinct 
categories, a more useful way to approach a critical issue in FIRREA is to 
look at these together on a continuum.  What we notice with respect to 
sanctions (and the related consequences of error) is that as the quality and 
the quantity of the sanctions become more severe, there is an increase in 
the number of safeguards that should be in place.  This is true along the 
entire continuum.  For example, when the consequence of an error is 
requiring someone to pay compensatory damages, the quality and quantity 
of safeguards are relatively minimal.  But, when the consequence of an 
error is incarcerating someone in prison or, perhaps, imposing the death 
penalty, the quality and quantity of safeguards should be at their highest 
level.  The same basic relationship is also true within a more narrow range 
along the continuum, such as what is conventionally labeled criminal law.  
For example, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not exist in every 
criminal case.  It is not triggered unless the statute includes the possibility 
of incarceration for more than six months.166  Similarly, the constitutional 
 
(1996).  With respect to FIRREA, Congress has already made the judgment that the specific 
conduct targeted in the predicate criminal statutes should be prohibited.  And, as we have 
discussed in the previous section, there are important public policy reasons behind 
regulation of financial markets.  For more information, see supra notes 117-30 and 
accompanying text (discussing the role of regulation in restoring investor confidence and 
stabilizing financial markets). 
 165.   See, e.g., Green, supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating that a civil 
proceeding under FIRREA is basically a criminal proceeding without constitutional 
provisions).   
 166.    In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court said that the right to a jury 
trial comes into play with serious crimes.  The best way to tell if the legislature considers the 
crime to be serious is to look at the punishment that is attached to a conviction under the 
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right to counsel does not exist in every criminal case.  In a misdemeanor 
case it comes into play only when the defendant is incarcerated (even for 
one day).167  In a misdemeanor case in which the judge only fines the 
defendant and imposes no jail sentence, there is no right on the part of an 
indigent defendant to have a lawyer provided.  The severity of sanctions 
explains all of these rules. 
The severity of sanctions also explains the need in some cases for 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  A conviction in a criminal case requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.168  The opinion in In re Winship 
emphasized the loss of liberty that imprisonment entails.169  And, even 
though no incarceration is actually imposed on the defendant in some cases 
and the fine is not large, the stigma attached to a criminal conviction and 
the civil disabilities that may be imposed on the defendant call for the 
highest standard of proof.170  By comparison, an administrative proceeding 
in which a fine is imposed by an administrative agency for violations of its 
regulations does not require such a high level of proof.  In fact, 
preponderance of evidence is normally an adequate standard of proof.171  A 
substantial administrative fine does not change this because the violation of 
administrative regulations does not carry the stigma of a criminal 
conviction and cannot result in incarceration as a punishment.  Congress 
can require a higher standard of proof, but in the absence of such a decision 
by Congress, the courts do not insist on a higher level.172 
 
statute.  Incarceration for over 6 months indicates that the crime is a serious 
one.  Incarceration for not more than 6 months indicates that the crime is petty.  So this is 
based on potential punishment, not actual punishment.  The right to a jury trial comes into 
play with serious crimes only.  See also Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) 
(holding that the defendant’s offense was punished by a maximum of six months in jail and 
thus was a petty offense that did not warrant a jury trial).   
 167.   See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that because the defendant was 
fined $50 and not ever actually incarcerated, he did not have a constitutional right to a 
lawyer).   
 168.   See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) at 361(describing the requirement that guilt 
of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 169.   Id. at 363-64. 
 170.   Id. 
 171.   Unless Congress requires a higher standard of proof in the relevant administrative 
statute, the Supreme Court does not require in administrative proceedings a standard higher 
than preponderance of evidence.  See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (concluding that 
in a deportation proceeding, the burden of proof is clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (adopting the traditional preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard).  For more information, see generally PIERCE, ADMIN. LAW VOL. 
II, supra note 138, at 971-73 (discussing the historical progression of the Court towards a 
preponderance of the evidence standard as the default standard in administrative 
proceedings). 
 172.   See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court has 
not required a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence). 
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Is preponderance of evidence an adequate level of protection in a 
FIRREA case?  The Supreme Court does not require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in cases where an administrative fine is imposed by an 
agency for violating its rules.173  This is true regardless of how large the 
fine might be.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in a 
deportation hearing that might result in someone being removed from the 
United States.174  In light of the horrendous consequences of a mistake in 
such a case, it is difficult to see why the highest level of proof should be 
required in a FIRREA case, which would entail, at most, a financial 
penalty. 
The conclusion that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not called for 
in a FIRREA case does not mean that procedural safeguards for a 
defendant are absent in a proceeding under that statute.  On the contrary, 
the normal safeguards that are available in a civil case are available in a 
FIRREA proceeding.  Moreover, the statute provides for the right to a jury 
trial.  This is noteworthy because while the financial penalty that might be 
imposed on the defendant places FIRREA in position adjacent to 
administrative law on the continuum, the right to a jury trial provides the 
defendant with a level of safeguards that exceed those found in 
administrative proceedings.175 
V. CONCLUSION 
FIRREA is a new weapon in the government’s arsenal to deter 
financial fraud.  Its use in the cases stemming from the GFC and outlined 
above illustrate its power.  In many ways that is good public policy.  The 
fraudulent actions by bad actors leading up the GFC should not go 
unpunished.  We want to deter future misconduct and to compensate 
innocent victims.  Enforcing the anti-fraud provisions of financial 
regulation promotes investor and public confidence in financial markets 
and in doing so supports the smooth operation of those markets.  The 
questions are whether the addition of FIRREA to the other, existing laws, 
both criminal and civil, is justified and whether its use is fair.  As a hybrid 
statute it imposes civil liability for violating criminal statutes.  It neglects 
the public policy goal of compensation, and instead focuses on punishment 
primarily for the purposes of deterrence. 
Perhaps the key (but not unique) feature of the statute is that it 
 
 173.   Steadman, supra note 171.   
 174.   Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).   
 175.   Jury trials and the rules of evidence that apply in judicial adjudications do not 
apply in agency adjudications.  PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at § 2.8; 
PIERCE, ADMIN. LAW VOL. II, supra note 138, at § 10.1 – 10.7. 
ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  2:52 PM 
160 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
imposes civil liability for the violation of standards of conduct that are 
contained in criminal statutes.  Many commentators176 argue that this 
arrangement— moving from criminal to civil law (or administrative law)— 
is fairly unproblematic.  The more controversial step is to criminalize some 
type of behavior initially.  This is based on a belief that criminal law should 
not be used lightly.  Instead, it should only be used when the behavior 
brings the moral condemnation that is at the core of traditional criminal 
law.177  Arguably, once we have decided that some action is a crime, 
attaching civil or administrative liability to it is not a big leap.178 
Criminal sanctions can be severe and the consequences of an error in 
determining culpability require that significant protections be in place, both 
constitutional and statutory.  Criminal liability is not imposed unless a strict 
burden of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt) has been met. 
Traditionally there is a mens rea hurdle that must be met; there is a 
presumption of innocence; typically there is a relatively short statute of 
limitations; and for non-petty offenses there is a right to a jury trial.  
Liability under FIRREA can be imposed without most of these protections.  
Under FIRREA, there is a lower burden of proof, no mens rea requirement, 
and a longer statute of limitations.  In this article we have argued that this 
does not make FIRREA a flawed statute.  The absence of incarceration 
among the sanctions that might be imposed on a defendant weighs heavily 
against classifying FIRREA as a criminal statute.  More importantly, we 
have argued that the failure of FIRREA to fit neatly into criminal law or 
civil law is not problematic. 
Although FIRREA does not fit perfectly into the administrative law 
model, the statute shares many characteristics of administrative law.  Using 
that model allows us to consider how best to achieve the public policy 
goals of protecting investors and restoring confidence in capital markets.  
By shifting the focus away from the civil law—criminal law dichotomy, we 
turn instead to the broad public policy goals FIRREA intended to promote.  
FIRREA is part of an array of statutes designed to protect financial markets 
and investors.  Without such protections, investors will lack confidence in 
 
 176.   See generally LAFAVE, supra note 131, at 22, 25-26 (2003) (stating that criminal 
punishment is harsher than civil punishment); Epstein, supra note 164 (further discussing 
criminal punishment).   
 177.   LaFave, supra note 131.   
 178.   By contrast, going from civil to criminal liability is much more problematic.  Id. at 
26.  Civil wrongs, either set out by statute or common law, do not necessarily carry with 
them the moral condemnation that is the hallmark of a criminal act.  Imposing criminal 
penalties to the violation of standards of behavior that are contained in a civil statute or 
common law rule is something that should not be undertaken hastily.  But this is not a 
concern with respect to FIRREA because it imposes civil liability for violating standards of 
conduct that are already contained in criminal statutes. 
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the market, which will lead to a decrease in capital.  The GFC illustrates 
how severe the consequences of inadequate regulation of financial markets 
can be.  Moreover, it is important that legal liability be imposed on the 
actors whose behavior contributed to the GFC.  This is important for a 
variety of reasons,179 one of which is public perception and investor 
confidence. 
The use of administrative law to achieve these objectives is not novel.  
In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission is an administrative 
agency charged with protecting financial markets.  Its broad enforcement 
powers allow it to meet these objectives, including the ability to bring 
criminal, civil, or administrative actions.180  Both civil law and criminal law 
have public policy objectives.  It's important to keep in mind that these 
overlap.  Both try "to shape people's conduct along lines what are 
beneficial to society." They accomplish this with somewhat different 
sanctions, although here there is an overlap as well.181  
We see FIRREA as creating a quasi-administrative scheme to promote 
the important goals just mentioned.  While there is no new administrative 
agency created to administer the policy set forth by the statute, Congress 
instead created a quasi-administrative remedy for a serious problem with 
the intent that it be administered by an existing executive agency (i.e. the 
DOJ).  Surely it would have been within the powers of Congress to 
establish a new administrative agency to carry out provisions of FIRREA.  
Giving this responsibility to an existing agency in the executive branch 
should not raise any red flags. 
If there is a need to place FIRREA within existing legal categories, it 
is best viewed as a quasi-administrative type of law.  The enforcement 
 
 179.   One reason to impose liability on actors whose behavior contributed to the GFC is, 
of course, to deter such action by others in the future.  See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the 
Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 232 (2009) (“A 
seemingly logical corollary of that effort is a call for stricter legal rules with greater legal 
sanctions to deter the next round of bad decisions.”).  Okamoto opines that imposing greater 
legal sanctions brings with it its own set of “unintended consequences.”  Id.  He writes that 
“the prevailing response to this logic (beyond any issues of fairness and moral culpability) is 
the fear of unintended consequences. What becomes of the American economy when the 
cost of risk taking includes the potential for personal legal liability?”  Id.  We would assert 
that asking the corporate actor to consider the potential for legal liability when making 
decisions is the intended consequence and provides deterrence against bad behavior. 
 180.   Investor’s Advocate, supra note 124 (“The Division of Enforcement assists the 
Commission in executing its law enforcement function by recommending the 
commencement of investigations of securities law violations, by recommending that the 
Commission bring civil actions in federal court or as administrative proceedings before an 
administrative law judge, and by prosecuting these cases on behalf of the Commission.”). 
 181.   LaFave suggests that “[p]aying damages (especially “punitive damages”) for torts 
or contract breaches is not much different from paying fines for criminal violations.”  
LaFave, supra note 131. 
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actions are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, only the 
government brings the actions, and the financial penalties are paid to the 
government.  Certainly, the situation in the financial services industry calls 
for such new measures to be put in place alongside existing measures.  
Congress found the existing legal processes, both civil and criminal, to be 
inadequate.  This is a classic case calling for administrative-type solutions.  
One of the major issues in administrative law is control over agency 
actions.  This statute adequately addresses any concern along these lines.  It 
specifies exactly what behavior can lead to liability and is very specific as 
to how to calculate the fines. 
At least one commentator182 has argued for a narrow interpretation that 
would in effect limit the application of FIRREA to cases of fraudulent 
conduct on federally insured deposits or depositors.  She argues that the 
effects must be “sufficiently direct, reasonably foreseeable, and not too 
attenuated.”183  We think this solicitude is unjustified.  If there is a concern 
about imposing civil liability for what is in essence fraud, we might want to 
contrast the sanctions available under FIRREA with the severity of the 
criminal sanctions available under other, related statutes that deal with the 
same problem.  In previous financial crises, people went to jail.184  Some 
commentators argued against the imposition of corporate criminal liability 
for a host of reasons; perhaps the imposition of civil or quasi-administrative 
liability for the violation of criminal statutes is a more palatable alternative. 
The DOJ can pursue a criminal case under a predicate offense if it 
thinks it can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  If it gets a 
conviction, that would entail the consequences of a criminal conviction, 
e.g., the stigma and moral condemnation, along with criminal fines, etc.  
Using FIRREA instead means that the special negative consequences of a 
criminal conviction are absent.  The sanctions can be severe, perhaps more 
so than under a criminal conviction, but this is not unheard of either.185  
Congress uses existing criminal laws as the standards of behavior in this 
non-criminal regulatory scheme.  We see FIRREA as a formidable weapon 
in the arsenal to fight financial fraud, to protect investors, and to ensure 




 182.   King, supra note 21, at 781-87.   
 183.   Id. at 786. 
 184.   See generally Zaring, supra note 1 (noting that even huge civil penalties might be 
seen as less harsh of a punishment than jail time). 
 185.   LaFave, supra note 131, at 12.   
